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Near East & South Asia

MOROCCO

JPRS-NEA-93-017

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3 February 1993

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Internal Affairs

King Inaugurates El Fassi Dam; Gives Speech

93AF0304C Rabat L'OPINION in French
31 Dec 92 pp 2-3

[King Hassan II's speech: "His Majesty King Hassan II Inaugurates the Ait Youb-Manata Project; A Sure Way To Develop the Rif Area"—first six paragraphs are L'OPINION introduction]

[Text] Allal El Fassi belongs to all; he is the man of all the country, and he symbolizes loyalty.

On Tuesday afternoon, His Majesty King Hassan II, accompanied by His Royal Highness Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed and His Royal Highness Prince Moulay Rachid, inaugurated the Aid Ayoub-Matmata project, near Fes, and named it "Allal El Fassi dam."

The inauguration ceremony was marked by the enthusiasm with which the local populations greeted the royal motorcade.

His Majesty the King's choice of the name of Allal El Fassi was a confirmation of the King's high regard for national movement symbols and a recognition of their struggle.

It also testified to the high esteem in which the leader Allal El Fassi is held by the King, who said of him: "This man belongs to all; he is the man of all the country and he symbolizes loyalty. We have in fact decided to remain loyal to him and to name this dam after him."

The royal initiative has had a profound impact among all nationalists, who saw in it the continuation and consolidation of the strong ties that unite the throne and the people in the pursuit of a common objective, i.e., loyalty to this country, its values, and its symbols.

We are giving below the translation of the speech made by His Majesty the King at the inauguration of the Allal El Fassi dam.

Praise be to God!

Prayer and benediction on the Prophet, his family and his companions.

Faithful citizens of the province,

Our beloved people,

We have come here today to complete the work we undertook two years ago.

By the grace of God, at the end of this period, we have managed to implement a new technology in the water-supply policy, namely transferring water from one zone to another or from one dam to another.

You are certainly aware of the benefits of this project. The Moulay Idriss I project will have a capacity of some 600 million cubic meters, i.e., the equivalent of both the Hassan Addakhil and Youssef Ibn Tachfine dams. With that much water, we shall therefore be in a position to

irrigate 25,000 hectares in addition to the area irrigated by the Idriss I dam. We shall also produce more electric power.

In addition, we have completed this project in a position of technical self-sufficiency that allows Morocco, praise be to God, to be legitimately proud of its youth and its cadres, in particular those of the Public Works and Agriculture Ministries who were always in the vanguard, from whom we expect still more, and who will prove equal to our and their fellow citizens' confidence.

Our beloved people,

I shall avail myself of my visit to this region to speak to the inhabitants of the Rif and its mountains, to reassure them that the problem of their agriculture is the focus of our daily concerns, both at home and abroad. Thus, we have decided to cooperate with the European Economic Community to launch a five-year program with a budget of \$1 billion.

This program will enable us to help the small Rif farmers who have been growing a certain crop that we condemn, and that international morality also condemns. Besides, they are not responsible in any way for the perfidious investments that are made around them.

It is with great joy that we announce the good news to them, namely that we shall soon shower them with more favors.

They must therefore remain at our side and work with their usual assiduity.

Our last message to all Moroccan farmers, from Tangier to Lagouira, is this: To encourage and promote the agricultural sector, livestock production, the food industry, etc., we already exempted farmers from taxes until the year 2000. Today, we are preparing to submit to the next legislature a bill exempting farmers from these taxes until the year 2020.

Why such an initiative? It is of course a gesture of equity toward farmers, both at social and ethical levels, recognition for their considerable efforts in favor of agricultural development.

Dear farmers, remain mobilized and firmly attached to your land. Commercial and industrial activities may be going through a crisis, but that is not what the land has in store for its owners. Quite to the contrary; if they till the land, they will reap its bounty. If they show attachment to the land, they will harvest its fruits.

Show more attachment to your land and your farming. They are the foundation of Moroccan society.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all Arab and European countries as well as the financial institutions that helped us complete this project. I would mention in particular His Royal Highness Prince Sultan Ibn Abdelaziz whose stay in Morocco, his other homeland, coincided with this ceremony. He made it a point to join our happy celebration, thus symbolizing the friendship and concord that prevail between our two

brotherly countries and the strong brotherly ties that personally tie us to His Majesty King Fahd Ibn Abdelaziz, keeper of the Holy Places. Our thanks also go to the State of Kuwait, the Arab Development Fund, France, Italy, Spain, and I apologize if I overlooked any.

Once again, I thank his Royal Highness and ask him to be our interpreter in expressing our deep gratitude to our brother King Fahd.

As is the custom, we are now going to name this dam. In fact, two years ago we gave instructions for the commemorative plate to bear the name of "Allal El Fassi dam." Two years have passed, and our decision remains the same, convinced as we are that this man belongs to all, that he is the man of all the country, and that he symbolizes loyalty.

We have in fact decided to remain loyal to him and to name this dam after him.

Finally, beloved people, we must recall that we are a country whose religion is Islam, which advises the faithful to invoke their creator. The Prophet, Sidna Mohamed, peace and benediction on him, used to say: "God loves him who implores Him insistently," for God's generosity is boundless. We therefore pray the Almighty that he should grant us his bountiful rain and surround us with his divine mercy.

We are full of hope and confidence in God.

The Almighty said: "He causes the rain to fall when despair takes possession of men, and pours out his divine mercy." (MAP [Maghreb-Arab Press Agency])

Ali Yata Discusses Elections, Parties' Roles

93AF0234A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
27 Nov 92 p 5

[Interview with Ali Yata, secretary general of Morocco's Party of Progress and Socialism, by Hatim al-Batiwi in Rabat; date not given: "Infusion of Funds Characterize Municipal Elections"]

[Text] Ali Yata, secretary general of the Party of Progress and Socialism in Morocco, announced that conditions had evolved and were now rife for his party to make a contribution to running the country's affairs on the local, as well as the national levels. In an exhaustive interview with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, Yata said that if the outcome of the next parliamentary elections were to be favorable for his party, he would not, in principle, turn down a request for the party to join the government, if such a request were made. Yata did say, however, that he would not be willing to take part in any government unless that participation was based on a clear program that he had a hand in developing.

On the other hand Yata affirmed his determination to give up the leadership of the party because he believes it is necessary to bring in new blood and give young people responsibility. Yata also indicated that he did not want to run for office during the coming parliamentary elections. He was alluding to the fact that he had his own

approach to parliamentary activity, and he indicated that his advancing years precluded him from holding on to that approach, which he found to be useful.

Yata also spoke about how his party fared in the recent municipal and rural elections, and he spoke about prospects for the next parliamentary elections, as well as the possibility of opposition parties launching their candidates in those elections under one banner. Yata also spoke about independents and his party's attitude toward them. The complete text of the interview follows:

[Al-Batiwi] Some people think, based on how your party did in the municipal and rural elections, that you were more optimistic than you should have been when you dissented from the democratic bloc and defended the revised Constitution. They also think that you were more optimistic than you should have been when you announced that you would be taking part in the elections. My question [to you] is this: Do you believe that you were right to be optimistic? Wasn't the outcome of these elections politically shocking to you?

[Yata] It is true that we had faith going into the election campaign, and we felt confident and optimistic. First of all, we went into this important political campaign confident that democracy was the only way for Morocco to develop and progress. Elections are an integral part of democracy. That is why we said from the outset, without any hesitation or reservations, that we would throw our hats into the local election campaign regardless of some of that campaign's negative aspects.

Nowhere in the world, especially not in developing and advancing countries, can exemplary elections be found. Each election has its flaws and shortcomings. We were certain that our local elections too will have their flaws and their negative aspects, but we decided to go into the election campaign so we can do something about getting rid of these flaws and shortcomings.

We also went into this campaign with a sense of optimism because Morocco did develop recently and because Moroccan democracy did make progress. We have made numerous gains, and the importance of these gains cannot be taken lightly.

These changes led us to believe that if we struggle, the outcome will have to be positive. There is also a third factor that made us go into the campaign with a sense of optimism, and that is the evolution of our party over the years and the significant expansion of its geographical terrain. Actually, the Party of Progress and Socialism has an organization in every one of Morocco's main regions. Our influence has grown; our organizations have become widespread, and our members, as well as our friends, have become numerous. These facts raised our expectations in the local elections, but these expectations were not met. For us, of course, the results of the 1983 elections are not to be taken lightly. In 1983, we received almost 50,000 votes, and this time we received four times the number of votes we got then. This time we received close to 200,000 votes, and we won 10 times the number of seats we won in 1983. This time we won 184

seats, but in 1983 we won 17 seats. Although that in itself is progress that is not to be taken lightly, we were expecting more than that.

So why did we not get the results that we were expecting? Because the recent elections were not 100 percent above-board. It is true that progress was made and gains were achieved. The authorities, which did not interfere in the elections as they had done in the past, maintained some kind of relative neutrality. Although that was very positive, unexpected things happened. First of all, dirty money was used in an unthinkable way to buy people off and to pay for their votes. Dirty money was used to buy seats in parliament and to pay for municipal offices. Thus, money was used across the board. Although our spending was limited, spending by others ran into billions of centimes. To us, this new phenomenon presented us with an obstacle. A second obstacle manifested itself in the deployment that we are seeing in Morocco for the first time. The term, deployment, which was borrowed from military usage, is being used in the context of the elections to refer to the practice by some candidates, who most likely receive assistance from local authorities, of moving a large number of voters from one district to their own districts, catering to these voters, and going out of their way to register them to vote in those districts so they can get their vote. Except for our party, most political parties made use of this practice, thereby changing the outcome of the elections beforehand. We did not use this practice at all, and I challenge anyone to cite one case when the Party of Progress and Socialism made use of it.

There was a third factor to which we have become accustomed, but which, unfortunately, we were not able to overcome: It is the practice of getting people to vote by having them use other people's voters' cards. Many parties took advantage of this practice and used it frequently. But how did they get their hands on these cards? Did they get them from the authorities? Did they print them? We do not know precisely how the parties got their hands on these cards, but we did not use any forged cards.

There were other violations that we think are ordinary, but we are fighting them [nonetheless]. But these were the three elements that changed and ruined the outcome of the elections. Our party was the principal victim of these illegal and unethical acts.

Did we find the outcome of the elections shocking? I do not want to use this word. We are politicians who have been active in politics continuously for 50 years. Ours is not a party that operates one day and suspends operations for weeks, months, and years. We have been fighting this battle on a daily basis for 50 years. Naturally, during this long period of time, we have had our victories, as well as our setbacks. In 1952 our party was banned by the French, and in 1959 and 1969 it was banned by the national authorities. Of course every time the party was banned, the ban was accompanied by restrictive measures, including imprisonment, eviction from one's home, and other measures. Consequently, we

have known from the outset that the road on which we would be traveling would not be strewn with roses. We knew there would be setbacks and other such experiences. That is why our election results did not shock us, even though we were expecting a different outcome. As far as we are concerned, we considered the election results an indication of our party's failure. We thought our party had failed, and we tried to analyze the many objective and subjective reasons for that failure. We are trying to overcome these negative elements in the coming elections.

[Al-Batiwi] It has been said that the discussions that took place during the meetings of the central committee were quite intense and that leaders were asked to explain and justify projections they had counted on. Is that true?

[Yata] I admit that the discussions of our central committee were intense and fiery, but such discussions are commonplace for us since they do occur in all the meetings of our central committee. Nonetheless, party members remain fully aware of their responsibility, maintaining their composure and discipline in defending their ideas and opinions. Nothing is more indicative of this awareness of responsibility than the fact that the central committee voted unanimously on the report that I had the honor of presenting on behalf of the party's political bureau. We, the party's leaders, that is, the political bureau, were the ones who called for free, complete, and conclusive discussions. We set an example by looking at ourselves critically and admitting the negative aspects of our activities, positions, and actions. We presented these negative aspects to the members so they would talk about them and say what they thought about them. We in the party are always calling for two things and acting in accordance with two things: We are calling upon others to watch us continuously, that is, look critically at what we do. We are also calling upon others to hold us accountable for our actions. Such conduct in our party is commonplace. I might tell you that we benefited a great deal from being watched and held accountable for our actions. Consequently, all those who were present accepted the position of the political bureau as outlined in the report I presented.

[Al-Batiwi] You declared that your party would participate in the parliamentary elections whose date has not yet been set. Don't you think that you will find it difficult to select your candidates, given the fact that fortune was not on the side of your leaders in the most recent elections?

[Yata] We served notice of course some time ago that we would take part in the legislative elections. We did that last March. At the same time, we decided to participate in the local elections. This is our position, and it is based on principle. We see elections, whether they are local or parliamentary, in terms of a political battle, and we fight in all political battles that will allow us to realize gains and allow our country to take some steps forward on the course of democracy. We will fight this battle as we fought the first one, with faith, confidence, and optimism. This is what keeps our conduct unchanged. Our

conduct, which is based on principle, will not be changed, not even by what, for us, is the unsatisfactory outcome of the most recent elections. Our conduct, which is based on principle, requires us to participate in the elections. As I told you, we will try to find out why our party did not win, and we have started looking into this matter. We will take measures to overcome our weaknesses, and then we will work with our allies to try and overcome the serious flaws that characterized these elections.

As far as candidates are concerned, I am certain that we will be able to have candidates in all the electoral districts all over the country, including areas in the Sahara that our people regained through struggle and sacrifice.

We found it difficult in the 1984 legislative elections to find candidates, but that was not due to the lack of men and activists in our midst. It was, rather, due to the fact that in some areas the authorities prevented us from looking for them and finding them. And yet, we nominated close to 190 party members candidates for public office. This time we will be able to have candidates running for office in all the parliamentary electoral districts. We managed to get 4,200 candidates running for office in the municipal elections. How can you think that we would find it difficult to select our candidates when we are talking about 200 candidates? That, thank God, is not a problem.

On the other hand, we are certain that legislative elections will be held in a climate that is different from the one we have known. I cannot imagine that matters would stay the same after the historic speech that the king delivered on the 17th anniversary of the victorious Green March. I do not think that matters will stay the way they were. King Hasan II, the king of Morocco, spoke quite clearly, unequivocally, and courageously when he condemned the unethical methods that were used. He meant the use of money, deployment, fraud, and illegal cards. This means we will fight the shortcomings, the flaws, and the violations, and when I say we will fight, I mean all of the opposition. That is why we can predict with certainty that the climate in which parliamentary elections will be held will be different. We are also affirming that we will take the measures that we have to take to correct our own mistakes, shortcomings, and weaknesses. We started taking those measures after the Central Committee concluded its business. All these elements lead us to believe that, for us, the outcome of the coming elections will be different from the outcome of previous elections. We hope that the outcome, in general, will be a true reflection of the influence wielded by each one of the powers that participated in the elections.

[Al-Batiwi] You called for a new alliance between the parties of the democratic bloc, especially those parties that took part in the elections. You also called for going into the elections under one banner. How do you see this alliance, and do you believe that it would be feasible at the present time?

[Yata] It must be pointed out that our party's conduct is based on the constant principle of working for the unity of national, democratic, and progressive forces. This was our conduct under the mandate, and it has been our conduct since the dawn of independence. We have never walked away from this strategic posture which is constant and permanent. Why? Because we believe that building a democracy in our country at this stage of our history, that of building a national democracy, is a task that no power can tackle singlehandedly or with cooperation from one other power. Building this democracy requires the unity of all the powers and the coordination of their efforts in a framework for joint action. This posture, which is based on principle, is what made us applaud the idea of a democratic bloc which we joined without hesitation. That is why today we are proposing that we go into this decisive election campaign with all the conditions for success in our hands. The main condition for success is the unity of the national, progressive, and democratic forces. The appeal we are making for strengthening the efforts that are being made within or without this bloc for the purpose of going into this campaign is a matter of principle. There is nothing new in it. Will we succeed in these efforts? I cannot answer that question because this is a matter that affects us as well as our allies. We have taken note of the fact that Abderrahman Yusufi, secretary general of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, was speaking for the union when he called for the coordination of efforts and the presentation of a united front in the coming election campaign. I was also relieved to take note of the fact that the secretary general of the Istiqlal Party, along with other party officials, called for the formation of a bloc. That is why we are looking at things optimistically once again, and we are doing everything we can to coordinate our efforts. We hope all the national parties will take part in these elections. I am talking about the National Alliance of Popular Forces and the Organization for Popular Democratic Action. We also hope that we will have one banner and one candidate in each electoral district. This is our hope, and this is what we are doing our best to achieve.

[Al-Batiwi] Have contacts in this regard been started?

[Yata] There are no official contacts, but there are nonofficial meetings during which we share opinions. I am certain that official contacts will be made soon, God willing.

[Al-Batiwi] You were critical of the use of money in municipal and rural elections to buy votes. Other opposition parties were also critical. In fact, even the parties which you call "right-wing parties" were critical of this practice in the elections. In your opinion, was this practice limited to certain parties only?

[Yata] It is really quite difficult for me to give you specific information. What we noticed and experienced everywhere—north and south, east and west—is that a lot of money was being used in an abnormal manner. That has been confirmed. Who then is using all this money to falsify the outcome, to gain votes and win the

offices of municipal and rural councils? As I told you the money that was used by our party was limited and it was clean money. We have given detailed reports about the money we spent. We received close to 300 million centimes from the state. The campaign cost us 500 million centimes, and we borrowed 200 million centimes. We are willing to provide the names of the banks that gave us loans at an interest rate of 17 percent. We are willing to open all our books to everybody, and we will provide detailed reports to the Supreme Accounting Office, as well as all the documentation for our expenditures. I would hope that each party would do likewise: put its honor on the line and declare all its expenditures. I would also hope that each party would indicate that it was willing to be audited. Let me repeat that we are willing to be audited, and we hope that this audit will take place during the coming elections. I also hope that the law that was ratified by the parliament before it concluded its session will be enforced. This law requires counselors to report the property they own and the property owned by their dependent children.

[Al-Batiwi] You raised a question in the report you presented in front of the party's central committee. You asked, "Is our society in Morocco in its present state of evolution up to the task of financing the elections? Is it up to this task that was undertaken by the state?" I would like to ask you this question: Has Moroccan society reached the level that qualifies it to experience the kind of democracy that is known in the West?

[Yata] First of all, with regard to the first point, it must be pointed out that social conditions for the vast majority of our people are characterized by misery, poverty, and hardship. As long as people are living under such conditions, we cannot feel comfortable with the use of state funds to finance the activities of political parties because these parties, or some of them, can use these funds to buy votes rather than using them for their legitimate activities. And buying votes would be easy in circles such as the one I described. For example, we contacted citizens who are usually sympathetic to us and support us. On election day, however, they told us, "We are with you, but you have to help us." This is what we were told in several areas. People in modest, popular circles thought that the parties were receiving funds from the state. They thought the parties had to distribute those funds to candidates running for office and also to voters. That is why I am saying that our social milieu is vulnerable to bribery and our citizens can be influenced on the elections, and that would spoil the outcome of those elections.

Although the parties need assistance, it seems that Moroccan circles have not come to the realization that this assistance is essential for organizing party activity and is not to be used for providing assistance to helpless citizens. The same thing can be said with regard to the democratic experiment. We think that our democratic experiment must be specific to Morocco and that it must take into consideration Morocco's existing situation, not the one we dream of. That is why I am saying that

copying the Western experiment in democracy is not in our interest and will not yield satisfactory results. We have to take into consideration the evolution of awareness and political thinking in Morocco. We must also take into consideration the social condition of citizens and the condition of the country's economy. All of this makes us say that we have to think of a democratic experiment specifically for Morocco, an experiment that would allow the country's stability and discipline to evolve and develop to the point at which the true high ideals of democracy can be realized.

[Al-Batiwi] You said it was hopeless to expect independents to do something for the country and the people. It has also been noticed that other opposition parties are always considering independents people who are on the side of the administration and who are subservient to the authority's commands. Don't you believe that opposition parties are making a major political mistake when they underscore the fact that they are keeping their distance from this tendency and not talking with it? Don't you think these parties are making a mistake despite the fact that a large constituency has lost confidence in political parties?

[Yata] I would like to zero in on my party's position on this phenomenon that distinguishes the political map of Morocco. We do not claim that it would be hopeless to expect anything from independents, and we do not advocate keeping our distance from them.

We regard independents, as demonstrated by the most recent elections, to be people who have neither a strong unity nor a harmonious bloc. We think there are at least three tendencies in their midst: One tendency consists of a number of independents who were associated with the opposition parties and who for different reasons left those parties. Although they continued to be sympathetic with those parties where they used to be members, they decided to take part in these elections and to run under their own banners as independent candidates. We saw some of those successful unaffiliated candidates cooperating with the opposition. The second tendency is made up of individuals who entered the fray of the elections for the first time. They are independent in every sense. They want to try their luck, and they want to try their hands at running local affairs. This is the second kind of independent. The third kind consists of people who are basically associated with the local authority. Many of them became candidates for public office at the behest of these authorities. Those who won their bids for elective office will continue their association with the authorities, and they will do what they are told. We cannot expect this group to do anything but cooperate with the authorities. It is possible, however, to cooperate with the other groups and to help them work independently of the authorities.

[Al-Batiwi] You said in your report that despite some of the negative aspects of the Constitution, your party voted for ratification without hesitation. Your party took the opposite approach of those who boycotted or spurned the process even though they are benefiting

today from the ratification of the constitution. Can you tell us how they are benefiting?

[Yata] It is known that we did not hesitate to vote in favor of ratifying the Constitution because we think it contains many new elements. First of all, it turned the constitutional monarchy into a parliamentary, constitutional monarchy. Based on this constitution, all aspects of Morocco's policy will be decided by the House of Representatives, which now has the right to form the government. This feature of the Constitution is great, and it has no parallel in several advanced countries, such as France, for example. If that had been the only feature of our Constitution, that would have been sufficient cause for ratification. We all know that this position will not be understood by various parties. We, however, do not hesitate to do our duty regardless of the circumstances and consequences for us. We said that political considerations were the reasons why others did not vote for ratification. Although they admit that the Constitution is a positive document, it was their political considerations and goals which kept them from expressing their beliefs and voting accordingly. We said that despite their negative position, they were benefiting from the Constitution, just like all Moroccans are benefiting, because the Constitution is applied to everyone throughout the country: those who opposed it and those who supported it. The Constitution does not benefit them in any special way, but it rather benefits them as citizens who enjoy all the rights and services that the Constitution offers to citizens of Morocco.

[Al-Batiwi] I would also like to ask you about the alliances that were forged during the election of those who held office in municipal and rural councils. Were these alliances normal, and where will the new experiment take us?

[Yata] It may be said in general that the alliances that characterized the formation of the offices of local councils were not based on principle. The overriding element in these alliances was the interest of the party, which wanted to be able to run the group or have a presence in the office of the council. That is why all the alliances that would allow the party to meet those goals were forged. It cannot be said that these alliances were forged mainly on the basis of positions and principles, but they were rather made on the basis of each party's interests. The consequences of these alliances could be disastrous. There is no doubt that councils that were not founded on true principles will experience difficulties and obstacles. These councils may not be able to do what they are supposed to do, and that is why we do not look favorably on what happened when the offices of the councils were being formed.

[Al-Batiwi] It seems that you are closer to the Socialist Alliance of Popular Forces than you are to the Istiqlal Party. Your opinions and points of view on the outcome of the elections are more like theirs. This similarity manifested itself forcefully in the critical look that both parties took at themselves when their central committees were in session. What do you think about that?

[Yata] Actually, we have always been closer to the Socialist Alliance of Popular Forces than to any other party or parties. This is because we find ourselves in agreement with this party on most issues that claim our attention at the present stage. We also find ourselves in agreement with this alliance about the socialist society which we want to create in our country in accordance with existing conditions in Morocco and with the goals that the people of Morocco seek to achieve. It is for these political and ideological reasons that we were and still are closer to the Socialist Alliance than we are to any other party. This does not mean that we are not close to the other parties, particularly the Istiqlal Party. As activists in the Party of Progress and Socialism, our ties with the Istiqlal Party go back a long way. Many of our colleagues were activists in the Istiqlal Party under the mandate and during the early years of independence. It may be said that our party, like other parties, is to a certain degree a product of this parentage. We find ourselves in agreement with the Istiqlal Party on most issues of the hour. Our step-by-step program is quite similar to the Istiqlal Party's. That is why we have always worked with the Istiqlal Party or tried to work with it even when we were working with the Socialist Alliance of Popular Forces.

[Al-Batiwi] It has also been noticed that the UGTM, [the General Union of Moroccan Workers] your natural ally, has taken an ambiguous position on previous claims. How do you explain this ambiguity?

[Yata] This is something that concerns the UGTM, an organization that considers itself a trade union force in this country, not a political force. The UGTM is an organization that is made up of activists who belong to different parties. Its leadership does not want to impose a position that would contradict that of any of the tendencies in the union. This may be the reason why the organization's positions during the recent elections were ambiguous.

[Al-Batiwi] You said during the recent election campaign that [since] your party had not participated in any previous government, it cannot be criticized. You called for giving your party the opportunity to serve in local as well as governmental decision-making positions. You wanted your party to try its hand at these positions, just like others did. Does this mean that you are weary of being in the opposition? Would you accept an invitation to join a coalition government if such an invitation were extended to you, and what would be your terms for doing so?

[Yata] The fact that we have been in the opposition for 50 years is incontestable. It is a fact. At no time since Morocco became independent did we join any of the governments that came into office and was entrusted with the task of running the country's affairs. This does not mean that we are trying to remain in the opposition forever. I would not be telling you a secret if I said that our party wants to make an effective contribution to running the country's affairs, not only on the local level, but also on the national level. We want to do this because

we think that present circumstances have developed to the point where they are now right for our party to make a contribution to running the country's affairs locally and nationally. It is not because we are weary of being in the opposition that we want to do this. After all, our party came into being to struggle, and weariness, therefore, is out of the question. Our party strives to achieve its goals. That is why if the results we get in the coming parliamentary elections are favorable, and if we are asked to join the government and to play a part in it, we will not turn down that request in principle. On the contrary, we will welcome it. But let me underscore that we are not willing to participate in just any government. We are willing to join the government on the basis of a clear program in whose development we had a hand. This is our basic condition. Of course we have other conditions such as having adequate guarantees for implementing the program that will lay the groundwork for the work that we will do.

[Al-Batiwi] You told me in a previous interview that you will give up your position as secretary general of the party at the party's next congress. Since you are planning to convene the party's congress before the parliamentary elections are held, did you talk about that at the recent meeting of the Central Committee?

[Yata] I have not wavered from the position I articulated on this matter. I am determined to give up the leadership of the party and, specifically, the function of the secretary general because I believe it is necessary to have an infusion of new blood and to give young people that responsibility. I am determined to carry out this wish and to introduce new blood into the veins of the Party of Progress and Socialism. This issue will only be settled at the next congress, which we will be organizing in the coming months.

[Al-Batiwi] Will the congress be organized before or after the elections?

[Yata] Let me tell you that this is truly something that is still not clear to us. We are waiting for some general and specific information regarding the parliamentary elections so we can make decisions in this regard.

[Al-Batiwi] Will you run for office in the parliamentary elections?

[Yata] There is a problem. The fact that I want to stay out of the elections is tied to giving up the position of secretary general of the party. This is what I want because I want to become involved in new personal business, not because I am considering dropping out of political activity. That is why I do not want to become a member of the next parliament and to run for a seat in parliament. After all, I have my own approach to parliamentary activity: I attend all the sessions; I intervene in most issues; I ask a number of oral and written questions; and I attend the meetings of two committees, namely, the Finance Committee and the National Defense Committee. I also receive a number of citizens daily who bring their problems to my attention, and I intervene on their behalf by writing to the authorities or contacting

them directly. I receive citizens—those who vote for me and, of course, those who do not—and I am always taking delegations of those citizens to officials who can solve some of the problems they have. This is the approach that I believe is effective. It will be difficult for me to continue with this approach, given my advanced age. I am 73 years old, and if I become a member of parliament once again, I would have to stick to this approach, and that would be difficult.

On the other hand, members of the party insist that I should run for office. Therefore, to avoid the appearance of wanting to reveal to the public the secrets of our leadership, I would have to say that members of the political bureau have made a unanimous request that I run for office. And I am really torn between what I am hearing from colleagues and from the party—and I have to listen to what they are saying—and my wishes and capabilities. That is why I have not yet made a decision. That is why it is difficult for me to say whether or not I will run for office.

Diouri on Exile, Opposition Movement, Monarchy
93AF0301A Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 28 Dec 92 pp 80-82

[Interview with Moumen Diouri, Moroccan opposition leader in exile, by Maria Luisa Blanco; place and date not given; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] The request to the West from the harshest opponent of King Hassan is: "Help us to bring democracy to Morocco."

In Spain Moumen Diouri has just published his most recent work, *A quien pertenece Marruecos? [To Whom Does Morocco Belong]*, in the course of a lifetime dedicated to fighting against dictatorship in Morocco. And he spoke exclusively to CAMBIO 16.

[Blanco] As an opponent in exile of the policies of King Hassan, what are you asking European governments to do about the situation in your country?

[Diouri] Talking now about politics is a little out of date. You should focus your questions on the figures. There are 26 million Moroccans, of whom 10 million lack a minimum, subsistence income. These 10 million people are a danger for the whole Moroccan community and also for the European Community. You are seeing "wet back" cases in Spain. These are Moroccans who are risking their lives to cross over to Spain. They are not leaving their country just to find a job. Above all they want to breathe the air of democracy and of freedom. I appeal to the Western governments and, above all, to the French and Spanish Governments. I say to them: "Look, the Moroccan people are paying dearly for the misery in which they now live." The only solution is the establishment of democracy. And to do that, it is essential to abolish the monarchy. I make an urgent appeal to Western democrats: "Help us to establish democracy. This is the only way to free us and the only way to escape the misery which overwhelms us."

I also would like to emphasize that Morocco is a rich country, with enormous resources. We only need to regain our memory and our property which has been confiscated by an individual named Hassan.

[Blanco] But the king of Morocco, in addition to being the head of government, is also the spiritual and religious leader. Do you think that all of the people agree on getting rid of King Hassan?

[Diouri] He has never been our religious leader. In Islam there is no concept of the divine right of kings. Under the rules of Islam the king appoints his son as his heir. However, what Islam requires is choosing a competent man in terms of religion and morality. It is the people, and not the king, who should choose such a man. King Hassan is not the spiritual leader of the faithful. He is not a descendent of the prophet. We want the Moroccan people to have an opportunity to choose the system which they want. If the people want a republic, so much the better. If they want a constitutional monarchy, marvelous. However, give them the opportunity to choose. In the referendum held in September 1992 (to reform the constitution) the government announced that 99 percent of the people voted, "Yes." Who are they kidding? They are kidding the people, and this is an insult. And the French prime minister went to Morocco on an official visit to congratulate King Hassan on the results of the referendum! In short, what we want is to establish democracy, as you have done. Do not forget that you lived under a dictatorship. Help us to establish democracy.

[Blanco] Many writers say that democracy can only prosper in societies which have been consolidated socially and culturally. Do you think that this is the case with Morocco?

[Diouri] According to Western concepts, no, we are not organized in accordance with European principles. However, if we succeed in eliminating the dictatorial regime of King Hassan tomorrow, whatever government which succeeds him will open the way to true democracy. We should not ignore a single Moroccan. Each one should contribute to building democracy. I am not excluding anyone, nor do I wish the death of King Hassan either, because in my view the best way of punishing him is letting him live to see that the Morocco of tomorrow will get along without him. I have never killed anyone and I do not call for the death of anyone. On the contrary, I am fighting for the recognition of all Moroccans. I believe that we have enough energy, enough trained Moroccan personnel, both inside the country as well as abroad, who are capable of reaching agreement on the type of society on which to build a state. We will begin with the first point: what kind of Morocco do we want tomorrow, what kind of agriculture, what kind of industry, what kind of education, and what kind of culture? If we start from those principles, there is no reason for not establishing a democracy.

[Blanco] Are you in contact with the Moroccan opposition within the country?

[Diouri] I was in the opposition in 1959. I was a friend of Ben Barca who, despite some mistakes he made in 1956, began to organize the opposition in 1959. Until 1963, when I was arrested and sentenced to death, I was part of the Moroccan opposition inside the country. Since then the people have been deprived of their leaders. Ben Barca was murdered in 1965, and the others were frightened off. That was when King Hassan wiped out the opposition. Now, when we see the Moroccan opposition participating in a referendum, knowing that there is no possibility of opposing the king, knowing that it is an electoral masquerade, it is understandable that the people have lost confidence. They do not believe that the solution can come from the opposition.

I think that the Moroccan people are always ahead of events in presenting the claims which they do. However, I have not found any leaders of the opposition capable of leading the people, and this is a serious matter. Now we are paying for this situation. Every time that there is a demonstration, it ends up with hundreds of people dead. It is always the people who pay, but the opposition does not do anything. If you read the opposition newspapers, you barely notice any difference from those which support the government.

[Blanco] You have a very low opinion of the Moroccan opposition. How do you think that they should behave?

[Diouri] I have absolutely no confidence, I do not have the slightest confidence in the opposition. Nor do the Moroccan people trust them. I believe that the opposition should go out into the streets, the leaders and the people, and demand a change. What can King Hassan do about that? Kill them? That is impossible. Arrest them, put them in prison? Why not? The sad thing is that by accepting that kind of game they betray the way in which democracy functions.

[Blanco] What is going to happen in view of the massive emigration of your people to Europe? What solution do you see for this problem?

[Diouri] It is a serious problem because it is only beginning. If Africa and South America join together, this means that virtually all of the peoples of the Third World want to invade Europe. It is forgotten that Europe and the United States have built their countries and accumulated fortunes with the help of the people and the resources of the Third World. That is the case with France for whom, furthermore, we have shed our blood so that she might be free and independent. And as far as France is concerned, there has not even been any cultural recognition on her part, saying that the Moroccans and Maghrebians helped to liberate France. Remember the recent case of the baker who killed an Arab in his store and was acquitted because killing an Arab was considered less than nothing. We are running the risk of having an explosion in France and in Africa, when we see the millions of Moroccans who live in misery. What do they have to lose? Nothing. Let me give you a picture of the situation: through television we have seen pictures of the Somali drama, those living corpses. I mention Somalia

because the drama this people is going through was not caused by fate or destiny. It is the consequence of colonialism and imperialism. We have not heard anything on television about the Somali Government or the true causes of the situation in which those people find themselves. It is not fate, it is not the fault of destiny, but rather the fault of the thieves and gangsters who are the leaders of these countries and who have ruined their people. As long as they are not pointed out, as long as we do not denounce those criminals, nothing will ever be accomplished. Siad Barre, King Hassan, and the other leaders are criminals because they are responsible for the misfortunes of their peoples. They are not the only ones. I also accuse Western colonialism for our misery.

[Blanco] During your visit to Spain have you presented any specific request to the Spanish Government?

[Diouri] I only want to say to [Prime Minister] Felipe Gonzalez that he should not forget that he was a member of the opposition in exile. He returned to his country and has followed a policy which I admire because he has done many things for his people. However, he should not forget those of us who continue fighting. If we are not given help to eradicate the dictatorship, root and branch, I believe that Gonzalez will be serving his own country poorly, rather than us.

Morocco is closely linked to Spain. It only takes a few hours to make the trip by sea, and he should know one thing: something must be done before it is too late, because governments change. Perhaps tomorrow Gonzalez will no longer be in power. Another person will come into office, and at that time we will reproach him for what he has not done. Above all, I ask him not to give further help to the Moroccan Government and not to sell more arms to it, because this is a crime. Arms are used to kill Moroccans and Saharouis. They feed the desire to unleash war against a fraternal people and neighbor. I do not see Morocco making war against any other country. Therefore, selling arms to a government like that of King Hassan is a crime.

[Blanco] In your view what reasons led Felipe Gonzalez to help King Hassan and sell arms to him?

[Diouri] I believe that this reflects a European policy of producing arms and an imperialist policy: selling arms to divide us so that we will kill each other. The problem of Western Sahara, on which we have spent almost two billion dollars over the past 17 years, has arisen because the Western governments wanted it that way. Are they not able to seat the Moroccans and Saharouis around a table to negotiate the matter? They have not tried to do this, and do not ask me why. I consider that this is a strategy followed by the Western governments: creating divisions among us. We will soon enter the 21st century. We remember things, and collective memory cannot be erased. It is stronger than computers. I would not want men who have known exile, such as Felipe Gonzalez, to have their record stained by dictators like King Hassan, when they have fought against other dictatorships in their own country.

[Blanco] You escaped a death sentence in 1963. How have you lived in exile since then?

[Diouri] Since my country became independent, I have never stopped working for a change in Morocco. I have always been a republican because I believe that a republic has extraordinary qualities. However, I want to point out that we are not fighting against a monarchy. In Morocco we have a sultanate. If I had lived in a country with a king, I would have been a monarchist. However, in Morocco there is a sultan who thinks that he is God on earth and who governs by killing and physically liquidating his citizens. I fought against that until 1963, when I was arrested and sentenced to death. In March 1965 I was released. In 1971 I left Morocco permanently to take refuge in France. In 1972 I wrote my first book: *Requisitoria contra un despota* [Demands Against a Despot], in which I wrote about the tortures I suffered and the names of my torturers.

I continued to be active in the opposition, although with great difficulty, because the French Government prevented us from holding meetings. In 1987 I published: *Realidad marroqui* [Moroccan Realities], a political analysis. In 1990 I delivered a manuscript of my book, *A quien pertenece Marruecos?* [To Whom Does Morocco Belong] to my editor. The French Police turned it over to the Moroccan royal palace and decided to expel me to Gabon. Public opinion was mobilized on my behalf among all French democrats, and this resulted in my returning to France after 26 days. I published my book in France but I left out an important section of it which concerned drugs. This section implicated French public figures and was very delicate for me. Now I am writing another book on the archives of the Moroccan revolution, dating back to the time of the French protectorate. Nevertheless, I want to make clear that I am not writing the history of Morocco. My role is to have my books talked about and so revive the collective memory of the Moroccan people. In my own way I am contributing to applying justice and I advocate democracy in my country.

[Blanco] What has changed in Morocco during your years in exile?

[Diouri] Many things have changed—unfortunately, for the worse. In 1992, after 30 years, there are 10 million Moroccans who have been robbed of their land, who are unemployed, and who are living in misery. They live on the garbage dumps surrounding cities like Casablanca or Rabat. This is a situation which is about to explode. If nothing is done, we are courting disaster. I do not long for the time of the French protectorate, but we have never seen misery like that which exists now. King Hassan and his group of corrupt, high ranking officials own everything.

[Blanco] Despite everything, do you view the future of your country with hope?

[Diouri] Yes. If I were not full of hope, I could not continue to live. Logically, I consider that every dictatorship will come to an end. We have seen dictators die

atrociously every day, as in the case of the execution of Ceaucescu and his wife [in Romania]. I have the impression that dictators love to play with life and I can state with assurance that the Moroccan regime will come to an end and in a terrible way. I do not want this, because I believe in God. I never want to have anyone die. Hassan is a product of the French. They support and control him. However, if they withdraw from Morocco, the Moroccan Army itself will throw him out. There is no doubt about the end of King Hassan. It is a question of time. As far as I am concerned, I have been fighting for a change for the past 35 years, so that I am not in despair now. Hope is great. I am sure that hope is going to emerge for the Moroccan people. Conditions cannot be worse for them than what they have now.

UNFP Leader Discusses Party, Elections

93AF0282A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
20 Dec 92 p 6

[Interview With Moulay Abdallah Ibrahim, Secretary General of the National Union of Popular Forces, by Hatim Bitioui in Casablanca; date not given: "UNFP Secretary General Abdallah Ibrahim to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: I Have Not Returned to Political Life Because I Have Never Abandoned It"]

[Text] Casablanca—I experienced a strange feeling upon entering the residence of Moulay Abdallah Ibrahim, UNFP [National Union of Popular Forces] secretary general, in Casablanca. This is because I could not believe that that modest residence was inhabited by a man who was, from 1958-60, the head of the first and last leftist government in Morocco's modern history. The residence is no different from that of any ordinary employee.

With his political assets, which embodied in drafting the first five-year development plan, establishing the dirham as the national currency—replacing foreign currency, and completing national sovereignty over the economic and administrative rudders, not to mention the public liberties law, the name of Abdallah Ibrahim is tattooed into the Moroccan memory.

A talk with doyen of Moroccan political party leadership cannot be free of digression into the jungles of history. Numerous questions came to mind while I listened to this man, who assumed Morocco's premiership even before I was born.

Two generations and the same Morocco. One may disagree with the man, but one cannot do anything but harbor great love and respect for him.

Since leaving the government in 1960, Abdallah Ibrahim has continued to march to the tune of a drummer that is different from the one followed by the politicians hovering in the sphere of the political game. He has continued to be loyal to the principle of noninvolvement in this game, whereas his colleagues have proceeded to plunge into the game head first. Politics is a big swamp. One can either plunge into the swamp and survive or stay at its edges and be bitten by its mosquitoes.

But Abdallah Ibrahim has a different vision for dealing with political circumstances, whether by writing, organizing popular rallies, delivering lectures, or defining political positions in every phase.

If some see Abdallah Ibrahim's rigid stances as some sort of face-saving, then Ibrahim says that his position toward the constants does not change and that he has always considered himself a political struggler, not a professional politician.

Abdallah Ibrahim was absent from the popular rally that was organized recently by the Democratic Bloc parties for the anniversary of the 8 December 1952 riots that followed assassination of Tunisian labor leader Farahat (Hashad). Observers have considered this absence a new divorce between these parties and the end of the Democratic Bloc. But Abdallah Ibrahim had previously told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the "Democratic Bloc is a historic act that may end superficially but will not end from deep within because it is a historical necessity." The following is the text of the interview:

[Bitioui] You have always been godfather of the tendency advocating non-involvement. Has your energetic return to political life a year ago and your accession to the Democratic Bloc been intended to serve this objective?

[Ibrahim] To begin, I have not returned to political life; I have never abandoned it. The circumstances engulfing the UNFP forced it to be isolated from public opinion. Of course, the UNFP, and I personally, have been compelled to deal with the political circumstances as they exist. This is why I have always been present with my writings, through rallies and lectures, or by defining political positions in every past phase of the struggle. This is why I do not see how I could be considered a man returning to political activity.

[Bitioui] You have declared your boycott of the municipal and rural elections. The same position has been taken by the Popular Democratic Action Organization. Meanwhile, your allies in the Party for Progress and Socialism, the Istiqlal Party, and the Socialist Union have taken part in the elections. What are the reasons that made you boycott them, and do you think that the Democratic Bloc will survive?

[Ibrahim] The Democratic Bloc is more than just a tactical course of action among various parties. Rather, the bloc restores political action in Morocco to its true task, which is to complete building the edifice of the independent Morocco. Everybody knows that the national movement and the Moroccan people in their entirety had two main objectives: The first was to topple colonialism and entrench the mainstays of independence and national unity, and the second was to build a state of laws and democracy. Before anything else, independence is a qualitative change in the Moroccan citizen's life. Therefore, the Democratic Bloc is, in my opinion and in the opinion of my friends in the bloc, more than just coordination among political parties. The front is, in fact, tantamount to establishing and entrenching action

so that Morocco's political activity can rise above the level of political maneuvering and of a chess game between various interests and can become serious and historic political action that has its justification in the eyes of the Moroccan masses. This is why, in my opinion, the bloc will perform its task if it follows this line. But if it swerves from it, it will fail. Perhaps the models, actions, statements, and reactions offered by the masses show that even in the mind of the Moroccan masses, the bloc is a whole lot more than just tactical coordination among various parties. This is how the bloc is, and it will survive in this form, regardless of whether there are those who will uphold it or not. Without dwelling on the past or returning to the spirit of the past, the proof is that Morocco lived under special conditions for a long time, i.e., in the 1960's and 1970's. But in the early 1970's, the national forces were able to meet in the form of an alliance between the Istiqlal Party and the UNFP. So the character of Morocco's political arena was changed; the balance of political forces was altered, and the door of hope was opened to the Moroccan masses. Naturally, numerous plots were hatched against the National Bloc, which was responsible for those developments. Ultimately, the bloc was destroyed from within, and the UNFP was punished by the splits it experienced within its ranks and by the battle of political maneuvers and bargains, which led in the end to the current arena in which the Democratic Bloc was founded only after conscientious officials realized that they were spinning in a vicious circle. This is why the first contact was made by brothers operating from within the parliament. They issued an appeal, which we all shared with them, urging the establishment of the Democratic Bloc. So, the bloc was not created just because of a partisan tactic. It was created at the peak of the crisis with a profound collective feeling that its creation, which was practically a return to the past, was inevitable.

[Bitiou] Aren't you afraid that the Democratic Bloc will meet the same fate the National Bloc met in the early 1970's, especially since each bloc member has gone his own way: You and the Popular Democratic Action Organization in the direction of boycotting the elections, and the others in the direction of participating?

[Ibrahim] It seems to me that it is not yet time to make a judgment on this issue and that we have to wait a little. The bloc met under hopeful circumstances and with the desire to overcome the crisis at a time when it was surrounded by maneuvers seeking to divide the country's active forces. I do not think the bloc is in the same situation now. But I believe that numerous circles and parties wish to see the bloc end because it disturbs them. The bloc is a historic thing that may end superficially, but it will not end deep within. It is a historical necessity that is tied to the only possibility to lead the country out of the crisis in which it has been floundering for years.

[Bitiou] Your political adversaries attribute your decision to boycott the elections to your conviction that you cannot get a majority and, moreover, to the fact that you

are not interested in the methodical organization of your bases and cadres, not to mention your weak popular base.

[Ibrahim] I congratulate these individuals with all my heart because they understand me better than I understand myself and better than I understand the complex conditions of the UNFP.

[Bitiou] This motivates me to ask you: What is left of the UNFP, which at one time was the main political force in Morocco. What is the size of your popular base now?

[Ibrahim] This question can be posed as follows: To what degree have the Moroccan masses ceded their fundamental rights and aspirations? If the elements that turned popular aspirations into constant and profound aspirations entrenched deeply in the real Moroccan society are not party-action programs or political propaganda, then this means that the Moroccan people's aspirations are still there. Another question is: Are the existing parties and official organizations the only circles that reflect these aspirations, keeping in mind that the Moroccan people are in one place and the official organizations that allege that they reflect the people's aspirations, whether in the parliament or outside it, are somewhere else. This is why the issue is the issue of the true nature of the Moroccan aspirations and whether these aspirations are just propaganda or whether they emanate from the real situation and from the citizens' daily problems.

[Bitiou] The UNFP seems to be so strongly embodied in you that you have overshadowed the other frameworks. Why don't you have a deputy or a party spokesman?

[Ibrahim] Because the conditions the UNFP is experiencing are not the same as the conditions being experienced by the other parties. The UNFP apparatus is now, and has been since the 1960's, a functional apparatus and not an apparatus to organize the masses. The link between us and the masses is embodied in the meetings we hold every now and then, depending on what conditions dictate. These meetings are organizational in nature, and their activities take the form of lectures, discussions on current political problems, distribution of books or pamphlets, or the use of any other operational means available to us.

[Bitiou] Your activity in Moroccan political life through the Democratic Bloc seems to reflect acceptance of rules of the political game, on whose appropriateness you have cast doubt for the nearly three decades that you have been demanding fundamental reforms. What is the minimum that you accept?

[Ibrahim] I understand from the question that there has been a change in our positions, which is absolutely untrue. The issue of flexibility or inflexibility is not the subject of discussion. When facing sound and objective facts, one has no choice. It has been my belief from the start that the country's sound forces can have no influence unless they unite. In this regard, you can review the

past, and you will find that I have always been for uniting the forces. The dispersal of these forces has always worked against me personally. This is how it was in the 1960's, when a split developed within the UNFP between what was called at the time the Rabat Organization and the Casablanca Organization, when the National Bloc was formed, and when the Democratic Bloc was formed. I have always held the firm belief that any disagreement among the active forces is an obstacle to the Moroccan people's attainment of their aspirations. This is why uniting all of the forces is the starting point of action for me. I am not a party man even though I am shouldering a historic responsibility in the UNFP leadership under the most difficult circumstances experienced by Morocco since I left the government. However, I believe that action dictates that one adapt tactically to the objective and psychological conditions.

It is evident now from the experiences undergone by Morocco that the number one problem is the democracy problem. Economic development policies or Morocco's position in the Third World stem from this problem. The solution to all of these problems lies in the presence of a strong Morocco.

This is why the Democratic Bloc is the first thing I have considered. My brothers in the bloc share this conviction with me. The first fundamental point was to submit to King Hassan II of Morocco a memorandum on a program for what may be called a minimal democratic system, without which no one can speak honestly about democracy in Morocco. I am not unaware that Morocco is perhaps the forerunner among numerous countries, meaning that we enjoy relative freedom of expression, as well as some Moroccan traditions that have supported continued political struggle. It should be noted, however, that we have experienced an ordeal where freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and freedom of congregation are concerned. Despite this, Morocco's image looks bright when compared with some other Third World countries. But the deep problem continues to be the degree of difference between the Moroccan people and the political organizations that regulate their life. Because of the profound conviction that this difference between the live and pulsating historical reality and the systems written on paper reflects an obstructive contradiction, I do not think that anybody with goodwill can fail to see that the people's vigilant organizations reject Morocco's real condition. This is why we have raised the democracy issue and submitted the minimal-program memorandum to Morocco's monarch. This minimal program must not be the subject of misunderstanding. We have submitted the memorandum to King Hassan II at a time when he has become convinced of the need to amend the constitution. In our opinion, we have presented the main points which must be covered by the amendment without any possible bargaining because they represent a minimal program.

In our opinion, this program is simultaneously fundamental and minimal for establishing a sound democratic regime. Nobody is entitled to say that democracy is sold

on installments. Democracy requires a government accountable to the parliament. This parliament exercises its powers as an interpreter and an element translating Morocco's sovereignty and watching for its enactment. Democracy is also based on impartial elections. Neither the government, the parliament, nor honest elections can withstand any bargaining or any plus or minus. It is either this or nothing else. This is why the amendment has not satisfied these ambitions, which are more than just ambitions. We have presented these clear, precise, and brief proposals so we will not spin in a vicious circle.

We have not demanded a more positive constitution than the 1972 constitution, considering that we in the UNFP and the Istiqlal Party voted against that constitution because it was inadequate. After a period extending from 1972 to 1992, that constitution cannot be a reference now. This is why we had no option but to refuse to embrace it. Consequently, there has been no change in the constants of our position. We do not believe that the Moroccan people deserve nothing more than biased elections, a superficial government that is a mere formality, a prime minister who has no weight as a responsible official in order that he can shoulder his responsibility, and ministers who are kept away from every responsibility that a minister should shoulder. To overcome this condition, the Democratic Bloc has offered what it believes to be the only way to accomplish this goal. Add to this that we are in an age in which everybody is raising the slogan "we are on the threshold of the 21st century." What does this slogan mean? It has become a meaningless slogan. It means that we are positioned practically in the condition which will prevail in the next 50 years, i.e., the condition of a generation of Moroccans who should accept the consequences of the choice they make now. Do we wish to be in a condition similar to that of Somalia, with my respect for the Somali people who are a fraternal Arab people, or do we want to be in a condition similar to that of South Korea, Hong Kong, or Singapore in 50 years? These are the options. What will put us in this or that condition are the rules of the game on which the Moroccan people have been consulted. Moroccans cannot move to the 21st century and cannot face their inevitable future with dishonest elections, a totally irresponsible government, and a superficial parliament. This is not the true path to the 21st century. We add to this that it is most likely that in 50 years, i.e., in the year 2050, Morocco's population will be between 100 million and 120 million, according to statistical estimates. The possibilities of development will be vastly different in a Morocco that has a population of unemployed university graduates, idle masses that do not produce, and hordes of Moroccans seeking a livelihood in Europe only to be humiliated and killed there. This is not the path to the future. It is not enough to exhort the youth and to allege that we are in the lead just to polarize them. The youth should be polarized so they will use their intellect and their arms. They should not be polarized just for the sake of party, government, or election propaganda.

This is why the Democratic Bloc's position is a natural position that is compatible with progress, that is loyal to the aspirations, and that devotes itself to serious solutions.

[Bitiouï] Your political adversaries characterize you as unrealistic and unpragmatic and say that you deal with the current political reality with the mentality of the 1960's.

[Ibrahim] If this is true, then the government I headed was managed by a phantom and its tragic problems were a figment of the imagination. I will tell you something that goes beyond the question but that still sheds light on my opinion of this type of questions.

Those who are expressing the opinions know nothing. They do not even read the press thoroughly and positively. They do not follow up on any dossier and they get to know others only in passing. They speak temperamentally. Even when issues are serious, they make judgments irresponsibly. This is their weak political point insofar as we are concerned. I exclude from this a select group of strugglers who know what they say.

[Bitiouï] In an article you published in ANWAL newspaper, you have criticized the unconditional political realism. How do you define the political realism?

[Ibrahim] There is a naive understanding of the phrase "political realism." One used to say: This is real and this isn't. But when Hegel said, "every reality is rational and everything rational is real," he gave realism its controversial aspect. So, there is an actual reality and a reality imposed by force which in turn becomes an actual reality in history's movement which either entrenches or foils this reality, whether with man's will or without it. Marx came later and transformed this statement into the philosophy of a social revolution and turned it into a creative plan for man who can change conditions with his will and his ambition. The reality of the Tzarist Empire, for example, was a reality of oppression, pressure, coercion, and persecution by the elite. But despite this, that reality harbored within itself its own antitheses that materialized in 1917. I am not saying this out of appreciation for revolution or non-revolution. What I am saying is that history harbors implicitly within its folds the future which can be envisioned with an accurate scientific analysis and can determine what isn't a reality now but will be a reality in the future. In the common understanding of things, we say the reality is so and so. This is why I said in the article that when (Catreau), a French general who was the governor of Marrakech District, brought the ulema together and asked them to proclaim the national movement strugglers to be infidels, when the ulema did actually express a legal opinion on the issue and started to gather signatures, and when I met the individual who was carrying the legal opinion paper in his wallet to have other ulema sign it in the street and who thought he was being confidential, I said to him, "may God help you with your secrets and with your difficulties with the wallet." The man felt ashamed because he was an ulema and a

magistrate. It was also a surprise to him because he thought what he was doing was unknown to me. This was the political reality. However, this ulema went to some other ulema and asked them to sign the opinion and they told him that would be inappropriate and then proceeded to reproach him. Those ulema rebelled against the reality and were arrested, as we were. The French protectorate and the general's administration ended. What reality is this to which one succumbs and under which one justifies his unconditional support for the authority!

[Bitiouï] Some people have considered this article a message addressed to Ali Yata, secretary general of the Party for Progress and Socialism.

[Ibrahim] Absolutely not. This article is not addressed to Ali Yata, but to those who manipulate the reality out of ignorance and who use their political realism as a screen for positions with which they cannot confront the people directly because they are feeble positions.

[Bitiouï] Your latest articles in the same newspaper since the referendum harbor in their folds a sense of grief and pain and they bemoan an age of dreams. We also sense from them that there is no hope in the future. Does this mean that you are not optimistic about Morocco's future and about where Morocco is heading?

[Ibrahim] I am not pessimistic. A struggler cannot be optimistic or pessimistic. I am experienced in struggle, and I was jailed when I was just 16. Since then, I have been in the forefront. I have struggled politically, at the popular level, and with my pen through the books I have written. Throughout this period, I have never been pessimistic or optimistic. Optimism and pessimism are not among a struggler's characteristics because a struggler lives under changing circumstances. He has to be constantly vigilant. He must not be frustrated by hardships and must not be diminished by conditions of ease because hardships and conditions of ease are concepts outside the struggle framework and have a purely subjective and relative meaning.

I am not optimistic nor pessimistic. Rather, I am pained for the Moroccan people who were offended by the 4 September 1992 developments at a time when everybody believed, perhaps naively, that this would be the phase of correction and of confronting the truth. It was painful when those developments occurred because we are approaching a number of years—I do not know how many—that will be tantamount to lost and regrettable time for Morocco and a disappointing time for all of Morocco's good people who do not dissimulate and who are not political mercenaries. We had hoped that the national course would improve after 33 years of our beating around the bush and chasing our own tail and that 1992 would be the year of the upsurge and of national concord.

Regrettably, 1992 has not been a year of national concord, and the proof of this is the positions that we have been compelled to embrace and that are embodied in the boycott. There is no ending point to a period that has

been the subject of criticism. This is why I felt disappointed when I wrote those articles.

Thirty-two years later, here we are at the hour of reckoning. In this hour, we cannot maneuver and we cannot lie to each other.

[Bitiou] At the outset, you referred to the Rabat organization's split from the UNFP and creation of the Socialist Union. I wish to ask you a question that concerns self-criticism. In your opinion, did you commit mistakes whose avoidance would have prevented this split or were other, and stronger, circumstances involved?

[Ibrahim] I do not absolve myself of mistakes. I may err. But I was not wrong or right. The split developed after 1963 when hundreds of UNFP strugglers were exiled in Spain, France, Syria, Yugoslavia, and East Germany. In that period, nobody was in charge in order that one can say that that somebody made a mistake. I do not absolve myself absolutely, as I have already said.

[Bitiou] There are those who characterize you as the "sole opposition figure in Morocco." Does this characterization actually apply to you?

[Ibrahim] I have greater respect for the Moroccan people than to believe such a thing. Perhaps I am the sole opposition figure in the political class. This is possible. However, I am not honored to be the sole opposition figure and I don't wish to be such a figure.

[Bitiou] The Democratic Vanguard Party was among the first opposition parties to declare its boycott of the amended constitution. Why haven't you invited this party to join the bloc? Do you have a certain position toward it, keeping in mind it has already published your statements in its papers?

[Ibrahim] I have already said that I believe in the need to unite the forces. If anybody deserves to be blamed for the issue of uniting the country's influential forces, then I am the one. No force, regardless of how great it is, can undertake the struggle independently or allege that it will accomplish anything for Morocco by itself. Therefore, it is natural for all the struggle factions to stand on the same ground, especially if there are intellectual or political obstacles that obstruct uniting the efforts. Within this context, I appreciate the struggle of the brothers in the Vanguard Party, and they are aware of this appreciation. I wish them success, and I hope that unity will be achieved among all struggle factions and individuals who have been tested by the times, who have not sold their conscience, who have not lied to anybody, and who have not aspired for personal positions which they conceal from people but who have continued to be strugglers, whether on their own or with the people. The issue is projected in this form no longer. Whether in the old National Bloc or in the current Democratic Bloc, we agree on the principles. The organizational framework is important no more.

I cannot make a judgment on what goes on within the parties and I have no right to say anything in this regard.

I am only speaking of our position on the election issue, which is a normal progression of our position on the referendum. That referendum was a major disappointment to me because I had not believed that the Moroccan administration would employ the means it did employ with total disregard for the consequences to Morocco's reputation and to the Moroccan citizens' trust in their administrative apparatus. Even though I belong to the opposition, I feel grieved and sad for the administration's conduct, which destroys the confidence in the citizens' hearts.

[Bitiou] The Moroccan Labor Federation has relied in its positions, characterized by some of its adversaries as vague, on your theoretical clarifications which advocate united labor union action. It has been noticed that you have steered away from the federation in recent years, and we do not know the reasons for it. Is this due to personal disagreement with Mahjoub Ben Seddik, the federation secretary general, or is it due to developments in your analyses?

[Ibrahim] There is no disagreement between me and Mahjoub Ben Seddik. Our relations are old, and my relations with the labor union leaders are old and predate the creation of the union. We were all tried by the same military court and shared the same cell in the 1950's.

What has happened is that the Moroccan working classes have experienced all kinds of woes as a consequence of the conditions undergone by Morocco, especially as a consequence of unionist disunity, which, I believe, is the most serious kind of oppression, and by this I mean the internal oppression that is embodied in creating disagreements among workers and in manipulating their rights. This ill development, plus the difficulty of daily life and the guarantees that the working class had in the past that have collapsed because laws protecting the workers have been either amended or not applied—all this has truly created extremely difficult conditions for the working class. Despite these conditions, the working class has not been divided, and its aspirations continue to be truly united to this moment, regardless of whether it is represented by this or that union. But where is the disagreement? I say that it exists in the unionist organizations. In making our judgment, we must not confuse the working class with the union. The unions are agencies from above that are compelled to translate the working class' true aspirations.

A union is, as we are aware, an administrative apparatus that manages workers' affairs. The working class is the producing class in its entirety. Therefore, the issue of agreement or disagreement with the Moroccan Labor Federation is not raised. However, unionist activity is stagnant and the positions taken are, at times, subjective positions that develop in some sectors from a feeling of frustration or of the futility of all action. This is what has harmed the general appearance and the content of the labor action.

I say that there is absolutely no doubt that when the Democratic Front was founded, the Democratic Labor

Confederation and the General Federation of Workers took a clear position. The Moroccan Labor Federation embraced the principle of supporting the Democratic Bloc because of its adherence to the concept of labor unity, meaning that this federation reflected the same things reflected by the two previous federations. But this federation preferred to express its position in a very detailed memorandum reflecting point by point the memorandum submitted by the Democratic Bloc to the Moroccan monarch on the political reform issue.

The three organizations reflect the same thing, but each reflects it separately. One of the things of which any Moroccan struggler can be proud is that no reactionary party or government can exploit the position of the labor masses whose aspirations can be subject to no bargaining.

[Bitiou] A final question: You have been engaged in political action since you were an adolescent. Aren't you tired? Don't you consider retiring from politics, keeping in mind that you are an intellectual and that have made profound contributions in the intellectual field?

[Ibrahim] God be thanked, I have not felt tired to this moment. Perhaps the secret behind this is that I am in full harmony with all my activities. I have never engaged in any activity coercively or, to put it differently, no activity has been imposed on me. All the intellectual issues I am experiencing are tantamount to an endeavor to find answers to questions posed to me. I have answered some, and it is not yet time to answer the others.

When I wrote *Standing Fast in the Eye of the Storm* in the 1970's, I tried to find meaning for the history of the Arab Maghreb. To find elements of the answer, I had to research 3,000 years of the history of North Africa, beginning with the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, the Romans, and the Byzantines, through the Islamic conquest, and ending with the current conditions. I summed up the answer along four axes:

First, the Arab Maghreb has always aspired for unity. At the same time, it has not been able to sustain unity for long. For 3,000 years, we have not agreed, and we have not gone our separate ways.

Second, regarding the cultural issue, Europe has followed a single line. The Roman occupation gave Latin to Europe and the Germanic tribes, and they developed along a straight cultural line, adding the Greeks and the Romans as a historical reference.

Inversely, the Maghreb was at the time so Phoenician that 70 years prior to the arrival of Islam, (Prokop), a Palestinian, said that it was difficult for a foreigner visiting North Africa to communicate with its inhabitants if he did not master the Phoenician language. The Roman language [Latin] then followed and produced such great geniuses as St. Augustine and other writers and intellectuals who helped the Romans define rhetoric in the Latin language. The Arabs followed, and the Arab Maghreb contributed very strongly to the Arab culture. Now, I say that there is a cultural problem. There is the French cultural invasion that is trying to pose a threat to the foundations of the Arabic language, even though this is not how the issue is seen in Europe. In Morocco, we have the complexities of a cultural issue that spans 3,000 years.

Regarding man's relationship with the land—a controversial issue that has spanned the same period of time—the question posed is: Does land belong to feudal "lords" or should land ownership be a public ownership intended for production, which was the form of ownership in Morocco until independence arrived and destroyed the major part of public ownership of arable land. So there is the problem: The farmer is the loser as a consequence of the industrialization and mechanization introduced into Moroccan agriculture, which has risen in many cases to the level of European agriculture, but at the farmers' expense.

Economic Cooperation With Japan Reviewed

93AF0304A Rabat L'OPINION in French 20 Dec 92 p 3

[Article by Laila Essadki, based on a document provided by the Japanese Embassy: "Morocco-Japan: Cooperation Is Making Progress"]

[Text] During the years 1987-91, trade relations between Morocco and Japan experienced considerable development.

The total volume of Moroccan exports to Japan doubled from 1987 to 1991, from \$150 million to \$300 million.

Moroccan imports from Japan also experienced a remarkable increase during the same period.

For instance, Morocco's 1991 imports amounted to \$127,481,000 i.e., double the 1987 total.

This development is essentially ascribable to increased industrial product imports, in particular trucks, passenger cars, busses, forklifts, and automotive parts. These accounted for about \$68,898,000 in 1991.

Morocco also imports other Japanese products, such as photo developing and printing machines, fishing nets, industrial sewing machines, and two-wheel vehicles.

We should also mention that Japanese imports are mostly manufactured products.

On the other hand, Moroccan exports, which increased considerably in 1991, still consist mostly of raw materials and foodstuffs.

Thus, in 1991 Japanese imported \$217,512,000 worth of squids from Morocco.

Cuttlefish ranked second (\$35,378,000) ahead of phosphates (\$14,547,000).

Moroccan exports to Japan also include products such as processed tomatoes, fertilizers, and tuna fish.

With such a trade volume between the two countries, Japan ranks as Morocco's leading supplier and leading client in the Far East.

We should mention, however, that Morocco's exports to Japan in 1991 amounted to \$301,643,000, thus resulting in a trade imbalance of about \$174,162,000 in favor of Morocco.

Concerning cooperation between the two countries, by 1991 Morocco had received 65.35 billion yens [Y] in Japanese public aid to Moroccan development.

Most of this—Y44.06 billion—consisted in repayable aid, with nonrepayable aid amounting to Y11.11 billion.

Technical cooperation, which accounted for about Y10.17 billion in 1991, covered in particular expert and study missions, and capital goods.

In 1990, Japan provided \$111.44 million, or 19.8 percent of the total amount received by Morocco under bilateral cooperation agreements. Japan is therefore second to France, which provided 38.7 percent.

As far as tourism is concerned, there were more Japanese tourists than tourists from any other Far Eastern country. Thus, over a seven-year period, the number of Japanese tourists visiting Morocco nearly doubled. It rose from 7,000 in 1984 to over 12,000 in 1990.

Signed Fishing Accord With EC Detailed

93AF0319C Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 18 Dec 92 p 10

[Article by Ahmed Belhaloumi-MAGHREB ARAB PRESS AGENCY: "Fishing Accord Adopted"]

[Text] On 15 December the European Parliament in plenary session at Strasbourg voted by a margin of 193 to 63 with 19 abstentions to endorse the Morocco-EEC fishing accord that was initialed on 15 May in Brussels.

The new accord covers fishing in both the North Atlantic and South Atlantic zones. There are increases in the categories of "palangres" and tuna, in keeping with the criterion of effective utilization on which the previous accord was based.

The financial compensation paid by the Community for fishing rights under the agreement amounts to 360 million ECU [European Currency Units] over a 4-year period, or 90 million ECU per year (1 ECU = about 11 dirhams).

As signatories of the UN Law of the Sea Convention, the EEC and Morocco commit themselves in the agreement to take specific steps to conserve fishing resources and protect the marine environment, with scientific research projects to study and appraise levels of fish stocks in Moroccan waters and new fishing techniques.

Conservation measures have been beefed up by increasing the duration of "fallow" periods from one to two months, and by applying these limitations henceforth to all fishing vessels in Moroccan waters. The Community is allocating 30.4 million ECU for specific actions and 9 million ECU for participation in scientific and technical programs, for the four years of the accord.

To foster expansion of the Moroccan fishing sector, 9 million ECU has been budgeted to fund professional training for local sailors and improvements in infrastructure.

A preferential regime for imports of Moroccan canned sardine was drawn up and placed in Annex D II of the accord. It provides for an initial quota of 10,000 tons between 1 May and 31 December 1992 and for partial suspension of the customs duties expected to go into effect on 1 January 1993 under the common tariff.

Readers are reminded that the EEC, which first established close ties of cooperation to the Kingdom of Morocco in April 1976, concluded a maritime fishing accord in May 1988, after Spain and Portugal's adherence.

Four-Year Accord

That four-year accord granted fishing rights to Community boats in Morocco's exclusive economic zone while providing for preservation and rational exploitation of marine resources and for protection of the marine environment.

A protocol annexed to the accord provided for fishing of lobster and shrimp on an experimental basis for the first two years, a feature which was renegotiated for periods running from 1 April 1990 to 31 March 1991 and from 1 April 1991 to 29 February 1992.

The European Parliament voted its approval of both agreements, noting however that the accord was very costly for the Community and that no data was available on catches or conservation of resources to facilitate a more in-depth evaluation of the accord's implementation.

Industry Minister on Investments, Privatization

93AF0282B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
16 Dec 92 p 9

[Article by Dirgham Masrujah: "Moroccan Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Privatization to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: Gulf Investors Have Offered to Purchase Moroccan Firms and Hotels; 25 Industrial Establishments and 20 Hotels Included in First Phase of Privatization"]

[Text] Casablanca—Moulay Zine Zahidi, Morocco's minister of commerce, industry, and privatization, said that Arab investors from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Libya, and Kuwait have made contacts to purchase Moroccan firms and hotels offered for sale within the framework of the privatization process being implemented by the government currently. In an interview with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, Zahidi said that some of these investors are current shareholders in a number of the establishments listed to be privatized.

The minister said that he expects AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT to play a role in Morocco's privatization process because it can publish details of the privatization programs and because it is distributed and circulated throughout the world. He noted that the privatization process is not just a process of making money but is fundamentally an economic and social tendency that constitutes an extension of the economic policy Morocco has embraced for decades, adding that the process seeks to stir and revitalize Morocco's economy, not to get rid of losing public sector establishments that are similar to Eastern European establishments because Morocco's establishments are profitable and productive establishments.

He said that a very complex process is involved in preparing privatization dossiers because one has to find out the technical, financial, and accounting position of each firm offered for transfer separately and that evaluation is fundamental for giving the buyer an accurate idea of firms offered for sale. The minister also pointed

out that the evaluation and preparation process has taken two years and that the entire privatization process will extend from the end of 1992 to the end of 1995.

Regarding the establishments evaluated to date, the minister said that they include 20 hotels and 25 industrial establishments in which the government ownership ranges from major to minor shareholder, as is the case in the other establishments listed for privatization. He also said that the sale process will take place gradually so we will not inundate the market. Soders Company, a yeast production firm, has already been offered for sale. The ministry is studying the technical aspects of the bids made for purchase and the obligations to which the buyer should be committed, including the employees' and workers' rights, because the two parts cannot be separated and because the buyer will replace the state in the future. Five hotels, each with a capacity of 60 to 300 rooms, have also been offered for sale. These constitute the first part of 40 hotels listed for sale. The ministry has received several offers from Australia, France, and Morocco, with Arab participation.

Zahidi has underlined the principle of the administration's neutrality in the evaluation process and in determining the prices, considering that these processes are entrusted to specialized and independent firms so that the administration will stay clear off material intervention in order to ensure confidentiality. He also pointed out that the law makes clear how to privatize firms through the financial market or by inviting purchase bids, or by combining both.

The minister announced that the investments are estimated at 25 to 30 billion dirhams. This figure is based on estimates made by the ministry, and it could rise higher.

The Moroccan minister noted that Morocco seeks currently to modernize the stock exchange laws and that the modernization plan has been presented to the government so it will boost the stock exchange enough to enable it to contribute to the privatization process. He also stressed the role that Moroccan banks can play in the privatization process by providing advice to the government and to buyers, by making efforts to channel a part of their deposits toward investment, by financing loan activities, and by purchasing shares in the markets and keeping them for a period of time before they resell them. The minister added that the ministry officials must sign files of all the offers made by 30 parties from Morocco because the privatization process can withstand no delay.

Interfina Director Discusses Privatizations

93AF0304B Rabat L'OPINION in French
20 Dec 92 pp 5, 7

[Interview with Abdelkrim Raghi, director general of Interfina (International Financing and Participation Company), by Mostafa Nassiri; place and date not given: "Finance, Privatization: To Provide New Tools for the Secondary Market and the Financing of the Country's

Economy, According to Mr. Abdelkrim Raghni, Interfina General Director"—first seven paragraphs are L'OPINION introduction]

[Text] When privatization operations take place on the Casablanca stock exchange, will that lead to the emergence of new occupations in connection with the evaluation of company profitability and the issuing of shares, to mention just these two? There is every reason to hope that this framework will first be energized through share issues and through the use of potentialities and expertise capable of supporting the process, and that then, thanks to the wise reform of the stock exchange previously undertaken, dynamic market mechanisms will channel the cash flow required by the market.

Without waiting for the process to start, some operations have already been set up, attempting to get involved in the privatization process through the offers that will be launched via the Casablanca stock exchange.

One of these is Interfina, a company created to take an active part in privatization operations and to promote the participation of domestic and foreign economic operators in the development of privatizable companies.

Interfina's [International Financing and Participation Company] shareholders are the BNDE [National Bank for Economic Development], the BMCE [Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank], the Moroccan Credit Bank, Credit Lyonnais, and the Banco de Espana.

These shareholders will be joined by IFC (International Finance Corporation, a World Bank subsidiary) and other shareholders.

In addition to its interest in promoting the financial market, Interfina may bring foreign investors to Morocco, through its shareholders' networks.

In the following interview, Mr. Abdelkrim Raghni, a senior executive of the Moroccan Credit Bank and Interfina director, describes the objectives and range of activities of Interfina.

[Nassiri] What are the objectives and activities of this new company formed in connection with privatization operations?

[Raghni] Interfina has one basic objective: to play a part in energizing the Moroccan financial market. As you know, most companies currently get their financing from banks. The time has now come for Morocco, as an accompaniment for its balanced economic development, to fuel the financial market through a revitalization of the stock market and the mobilization of new resources, especially in the form of shares, bonds, etc.; it is in providing such impetus that Interfina will find its essential role. Nevertheless, its range of activities will be restricted to privatization operations. Its goal is to acquire an interest in privatizable companies. Our goal in doing so is not to control these companies. We do not aim to control them.

In addition to acquiring an interest in these companies, we also want to act as a catalyst for the boards of

directors, i.e., we want to attract local or foreign professional shareholders bringing in new technologies or a sizeable capital, and who also may enable privatizable companies to expand their range and their markets. It is in constituting such boards that Interfina will act as a catalyst.

[Nassiri] How does Interfina expect to promote the various operators' participation?

[Raghni] This will be done in two ways because current shareholders created the company with a 10-year objective. After that, the fund should normally be liquidated.

In a first stage, we would wish the corporation to be listed on the stock exchange—the fund shares will therefore be offered on the stock exchange—in which case they will be available to the public at large. From that moment onward, it is the public that will manage Interfina. By purchasing Interfina shares it will energize the financial market, and through Interfina it will be able to find remunerative investments backed up by a number of privatizable companies in diversified sectors.

[Nassiri] Will Interfina be a sort Sicav [French mutual fund]?

[Raghni] In a way, it will be a Sicav-like limited-term mutual fund.

[Nassiri] Interfina's activity seems to be limited...

[Raghni] Interfina is limited in time, but not in its activity, as its role is to trigger a process. The current promoters start with a policy. Let's us assume now that the financial market will work so well that Interfina shares will be owned by the public at large in 10 years from now. The current promoters will no longer have their say. The company could continue as a portfolio holding company or as an investment bank.

For the time being, we do not want to anticipate what must be quite clear from the start [sic]. In particular, we do not want Interfina's objectives in privatization to exceed the bounds of the present framework. We do not want to implement a policy that would aim to control privatizable companies.

[Nassiri] Until now, privatization has been achieved by the bidding method. Interfina will operate on the financial market "which cannot fail to be attracted." What allows you to say that?

[Raghni] Interfina will operate on the financial market. The first privatization operations used a bidding procedure. But we should not rule out the possibility that large privatization operations could resort to issuing shares on the stock market, in which case Interfina would act like any other share buyer. What makes us say that is that some deals will be large enough to warrant having recourse to the stock market. It is not practical to use the stock market for small companies, small amounts of capital. It would take companies like the cement mills perhaps, the CTM [Moroccan Transport Company], etc.,

which could not be absorbed by a single partner or bidder, companies for which a call for bids would not be suitable.

[Nassiri] In your opinion, to what extent can an embryonic financial market like ours mobilize funds and arouse the operators' interest?

[Raghni] This, in a way, is the problem of the chicken and the egg. We do not have an active market. How can we make it become active? We shall make it active, first, through a judicious revision of laws and regulations. The government is currently working on this and we have great hopes that new texts will be issued as soon as possible. These will somewhat better regulate the Moroccan financial landscape and, through various measures, will make it attractive for domestic savings, because this is what is at stake: It is imperative to promote domestic savings and channel them to the financial market where they can yield a profit under good conditions. For this, we do not have any magic potion. It is a question of will, of setting up attractive mechanisms, because what investors are looking for on the stock market is satisfactory yields and security for their investments, and therefore satisfactory information on companies. In this respect, there must exist great transparency at company level; third, investors look for liquidity. They must be able to cash in their investments at any time. Therefore, the market must be remunerative, safe, transparent, and liquid.

[Nassiri] What do you think of privatization operations? To what extent can they promote investment?

[Raghni] Today, personally, what I can say as to what characterizes the Moroccan privatization process is that it is not subject to dogmatic constraints. It is a deliberate choice made by the government to get out of certain sectors where its presence is no longer warranted, to get out within a reasonable time and under conditions that are quite equitable with respect to the market. The state is not having a clearance sale, and the goal of privatization operations is not to sell all of the country's assets at any price. It is fortunate that the Moroccan privatization process has this characteristic, as it results in balanced negotiations between the state, which is the seller, and the market, which will be the buyer. This negotiation process involves evaluations. The state does not make evaluations haphazardly and at any time. It makes evaluations by means of quite transparent methods and jointly with world-renowned organizations. Evaluations, therefore, are always very reliable. The committees that have been set up operate in a perfectly reasonable manner. The process—as I see it—is a series of transactions between the State and domestic and local partners, at market conditions. If, until now, the stock market has been embryonic—as you said—that is because of a lack of share issuers, not buyers. Potential buyers and savings are there, but the stock market cannot manage to channel these savings because there are not enough securities being offered. Privatization will initiate the share issuing process and, I hope, a market will be created through the liquidity required for such a market [sic], a secondary

market that would cause the largest capital flows to be channeled through the stock market.

[Nassiri] Is Interfina specifically considering certain privatizable companies?

[Raghni] No! Interfina does not have objectives in terms of sector, nor in terms of companies. We are not considering any specific operation. Interfina wishes to study all the deals available and offered on the market.

It will choose the deals that interest it based on its criteria, which are purely financial and professional criteria. However, in making such choices, we have a number of operating rules: Interfina will not invest more than 15 percent of its own capital in any given company. Second limitation: in any given deal, Interfina will not acquire more than 20 percent of the capital of the privatized company. In other words, our participation will always remain below 20 percent of the privatized company's capital. We will also not invest more than 25 percent in any one of the following eight sectors:

- Agriculture, fishing, forestry, and forestry products;
- Energy and mining operations;
- Chemicals and metallic, electric, or electronic products;
- Food and beverages;
- Textiles and leather;
- Construction of buildings, civil engineering, and transportation;
- Tourism;
- Financial sectors.

We will not invest more than 25 percent of our capital in any one of these sectors; we will not invest more than 15 percent of our capital in any one company; and we will not acquire more than a 20-percent interest in any one company.

These are the management rules that will yield a balanced portfolio, by sector and by companies, so that in each case our interests will be diversified and less than a controlling interest in these companies.

Interfina is a company of a new type which, I hope, will operate in an innovative manner.

Through our transparency and our professionalism, we want to provide tools for the secondary market and the financing of the domestic economy, which should win over our people and our savers.

Another interesting characteristic of Interfina is that our board of directors comprises three Moroccan banks. The BNDE, the BMCE, and the Moroccan Credit Bank. We also have two foreign banks: Credit Lyonnais and the Banco Exterior de Espana. The International Finance Corporation Company (IFC, a World Bank subsidiary) will join them in the next few weeks. We also have other well-known shareholders who will join us also in the next few weeks.

Through this board of directors, where each partner is in contact with domestic or foreign potential investors, we can avail ourselves of all the networks of all these

investors. We could offer quality, approach methods, and even financial deals that would be quite modern compared with what is done in the most advanced countries in the world. We can also involve foreign investors of interest to the national economy. The IFC, for instance, which invests in Latin American countries can lead investors to Morocco, in the agrifood or chemical sectors, etc.

As far as privatization is concerned, through Interfina we contribute the private sector's presence and its answer to the public call, with adequate means. We contribute quite a positive solution to the process.

We find ourselves dealing with material concepts, and we set up structures worthy of this privatization, and shareholders are willing to invest more.

We work in the short term with a view to providing tonic operations on the market.

By limiting Interfina's term to 10 years, we, the company management, are exposed to shareholders' pressure to do the best we can in a very short time. This, by the way, is a challenge that Moroccan managers involved in privatization will have to meet.

Today, I hope that structures are finalized both on the government and on the private side. I believe that the balanced climate that currently prevails will make for effective and balanced privatization that will achieve its social, financial, and economic objectives, also through the emergence of new occupations initiated by the process: consulting, analyzing, allocating capital, issuing shares among the public, etc. This, I am sure, will give us a boost that will prove quite useful, necessary, and vital for our future in connection with the new course that our development is about to take. This will enable us to catch up with the European environment to an extent in keeping with our political and economic ambitions.

Economic Potential of Central-Southern Region

93AF0289A Rabat ALMAGHRIB in French 15 Dec 92
p 4

[Article: "Predominance of Agriculture But Considerable Possibilities for Tourism and Industry"]

[Excerpts] The central-southern region, comprising the Meknes Governorate and Errachidia, Ifrane, and Khenifra Provinces, appears as a meeting point or transitional zone between the northern, southern, eastern, and western parts of the kingdom.

According to 1989 statistics, the region has an estimated population of 1,768,000, and its residents live in an area of 79,210 square km, or 11 percent of the total national territory. [passage omitted]

Productive Activities

Productive activities owe their considerable robustness to the central-southern region's geographic diversity.

One of the region's chief assets is the fact that it still constitutes a large pool of diversified natural resources, a

circumstance that is enormously helpful in enabling it to attract very valuable investments.

a) Agriculture

This, because of its economic importance, is the region's predominant activity, since it supports nearly 45 percent of the region's active population. It is also predominant in terms of volume of production compared to that of other sectors of activity. Agriculture owes its development to the presence of many factors, among them the following:

1. Vast plains where developed and modern agriculture is practiced.

2. Abundant precipitation turning to snow in areas near the Grand Atlas and Middle Atlas mountain chains (considered one of the kingdom's water reservoirs). Added to that are the many streams, springs, and rivers that run through the region and on which large dams have been built (Hassan Addakhil).

Cereal and legume crops occupy first place in the region, accounting respectively for 9.2 percent and 8.4 percent of the nation's total production of those two food crops. This confirms the region's vast potential. Legume crops cover an area of more than 35,280 hectares [ha]. Production has reached 294,300 quintals, or 8.4 percent of national production. Fresh vegetables are grown in an area of 18,930 hectares. For their part, oilseeds have experienced intensive development over the past 10 years: sunflower production shows clear progress with a total of 364,579 quintals, or 37.8 percent of nationwide production. The area devoted to this crop totals 34,300 ha.

As regards fruit trees, the region continues to occupy a prime position nationwide, especially from the standpoint of winegrowing and the growing of apples, olives, and dates. The area devoted to fruit trees totals 66,677 ha and is concentrated in the areas of Meknes, Ifrane (Tigrigra), and Khenifra (Midelt). Stockraising is a basic activity in the region. It consists mainly of extensive stockraising, which owes its development to the existence of vast open and forested rangeland.

To deal with the deterioration of rangeland, the authorities have started a number of projects to improve grazing land and rationalize its use. As examples, we can mention the development project covering the Aarid pastoral improvement area in the Midelt area and the Middle Atlas project, which concerns Ifrane and Khenifra Provinces and of which the bulk consists of its pastoral component.

b) Industrial Activity

Although the region's economy is centered basically on agriculture, there is reason to mention the extent of its rapid industrial growth—which for that matter is largely the result of its agricultural calling.

The main components of the central-southern region's industrial activity are these:

1. The food industry.
2. The textile industry.
3. Industries linked to wood processing.
4. The engineering and metal processing industry.

From the standpoint of the number of industrial establishments making up the processing industry, the central-southern region with its 162 firms accounts for only 3.3 percent of the total number of such firms nationwide.

Moreover, regional employment in those firms amounts to only 2.8 percent of total employment in the same industry throughout the kingdom.

c) Handicrafts

It must be noted that handicrafts in the region constitute a vital sector of the economy, being in second place after agriculture. This is due not only to the large number of people earning their living from that activity but also to the importance of handicrafts as a component of gross domestic product.

Because of their importance and especially their specific characteristics (abundant capital, a semi-industrial structure, and so on), handicrafts are destined to play a driving role in the gradual transformation of what is called the traditional economy with a view to its integration into the "modern economy."

Briefly put, this sector is divided into three categories:

1. Utilitarian handicrafts:

With the exception of tanning and the interior decoration of buildings, the utilitarian sector is faced with keen competition in the marketplace from industrial production. In foreign markets, on the other hand, the taste for originality and the desire to standardize are opening up sizable markets for these handicrafts.

2. Artistic handicrafts:

There is very little competition in the field of artistic handicrafts; on the contrary, the rising standard of living is producing an increase in demand, to which must be added the highly valued demand on the part of tourists.

3. Service handicrafts:

Service handicrafts play a complementary role in the area covered by industry and the firms by providing small-scale labor and services not requiring real skills. In some ways, this is a "hedge" sector whose reason for being is the the practical and immediate needs of daily living.

It should be pointed out, incidentally, that the number of craftsmen in the region is estimated at 31,500 individuals.

d) Tourism

The central-southern region possesses diversified tourist potential, namely in terms of historical sites consisting of the remains of ancient sites such as Volubilis, Medina (most of whose buildings constitute an architectural heritage of inestimable value), the peaks of the Middle Atlas (covered with snow for a large part of the year), the

natural sites found in the middle of forests around lakes or in the Tafilalet oases, whose greenery contrasts with the dunes of the desert, and so on.

Besides those assets, other possibilities of an artistic or recreational nature help reinforce those potentialities, namely the "moussem" [religious festival] in Imilchil, the date festival in Erfoud, the hunting seasons, the moussem in Moulay Idriss, and the moussem in Sidi Ali, which comes soon after the festival of Mouloud in Meknes.

Despite that diversity and its vast tourist potential, the region is generally no more than a transit zone for foreign tourists.

There were 3,065 hotel beds in 1989, or 9 percent more than in 1987. The number of overnight stays in the region is still rather low, since it accounts for only 3.9 percent of all overnight stays nationwide in hotels of the same category.

Use of Waste Water for Irrigation Discussed

93AF0279B Rabat ALMAGHRIB in French 9 Nov 92
p 7

[Unattributed article reprinted from REVUE MAROCAINE DE L'EAU, date and pages not given: "Making the Most of Waste Water and Agricultural Irrigation in Morocco: A Multiple-Use Resource"; first two paragraphs are ALMAGHRIB introduction]

[Text] *Because Morocco is located in a semi-arid to arid region, its hydraulic potential is extremely limited. Major efforts have been made to harness available water resources so as to satisfy ever growing water needs. Thus in the case of agriculture, the irrigable potential makes up only 20 percent of the useful agricultural area. With this as background, making the most of waste water in agricultural irrigation can certainly help satisfy agricultural needs. This will also make it possible to protect water resources from the pollution generated by waste water which is thrown out.*

However this reuse requires that the problems that result from it be solved, especially environmental impact.

Morocco's climate is Mediterranean, arid to semi-arid in most of its territory. So despite the major effort undertaken since the 1960s, which made it possible to harness close to 60 percent of the potential of its water resources, the latter remain very limited. So in the case of agriculture, whose added value increases noticeably with irrigation, the irrigable potential accounts for only 20 percent of the country's 7.5 million hectares of useful agricultural area.

With this in mind, in Morocco waste water is not viewed only as a source of pollution to be treated but also as a not inconsiderable water resource, which can be reused in a way that is very beneficial to agriculture or for other uses. However this reuse requires that problems concerning public health and the environment be solved.

Overview of Existing Water Resources

In Morocco, of the average 150 billion m³ of precipitation that falls each year, 120 billion evaporate and the potentially harnessable volume per year hardly exceeds 21 billion m³. Given current existing infrastructures, the regulatable volume has been estimated at 11.5 billion m³, of which 3.5 billion come from underground water.

Agriculture uses approximately 93 percent of this volume, which makes it possible to irrigate an area on the order of 1.2 million hectares, of which 0.85 million hectares are irrigated on an annual basis. This area accounts for only 17 percent of the useful agricultural area, which is equal to 7.5 million hectares. Besides, the irrigable potential, which is 1.6 million hectares, affects only 21 percent of this useful agricultural area.

This situation has encouraged farmers in Morocco to irrigate with unconventional water such as salt and waste water. The latter has long been reused to irrigate several small areas outside certain large continental cities, but this practice tends to grow downstream from other urban areas. This water is valued as a water resource and also as a fertilization source. However this reuse for irrigation is done with crude used water, which has not undergone any prior purification. This irrigation can produce several types of risk, viz. health risks for humans and livestock owing to illnesses that are transmitted by water; pollution risks, both chemical (heavy metals, salts, etc.) and microbiological (pathogenic agents) in the soil in the long term, and risks of contaminating underground water (heavy metals, nitrates, pathogenic agents, etc.).

Importance and Characteristics of Waste Water

The annual volume of waste water thrown out by all urban areas was estimated to be 370 million m³ for 1990. It will reach 500 to 700 million m³ by the years 2000 and, on the horizon, 2020 respectively (see figure 1 [not reproduced]). This major progression is due to the large demographic growth being experienced by cities, estimated at 5 percent annually. This water is far from being uniformly divided up among the seven hydrological basins which make up the national territory. Indeed 66 percent of them are produced in the two basins of Oum Er-Rbia and Sebou.

At the moment a certain number of studies and experiments are being carried out throughout the country to promote a rational and well controlled reuse of waste water in agriculture.

One study was conducted in April 1990 (M. Bouchama, 1990). The first part of this study, entitled *Etude quantitative—potentiel eau usee au Maroc [Quantitative Study—The Potential for Waste Water in Morocco]*, provides figures on the volumes of waste water thrown out by Moroccan urban areas as well as a projection into future years. A distribution of this thrown out [water] by economic region revealed that the economic regions of the center and northwest by themselves account for 60 percent of what is thrown out by urban areas, which comes essentially from coastal cities. As a general rule,

these cities flush their effluents out into the sea. Most of what is thrown out by continental cities comes from the cities of Fes, Marrakech, and Meknes, with a volume in excess of 60 million m³ per year.

The polluting burden of domestic waste water varies, on average, from 130 to 530 mg/l and from 260 to 620 mg/l. In 1987, industry's share of the total of thrown out waste water was 12 percent.

Industrial wastes are definitely more polluted. The farm produce industry, sugar mills in particular, is one of the biggest sources of pollution; further, which is all the more harmful because it is dumped into bodies of water in the summer when water levels are at their lowest.

Reuse of Waste Water in Agriculture

This waste water, which is valued as both a water resource and a fertilization source, has long been used for irrigation downstream from certain big continental urban areas in places where fields are available downstream from places where effluents are disposed of. This waste water currently irrigates, with a volume exceeding 60 million m³ per year, an area greater than 6,000 hectares including places where trees, fodder, and cereals are grown, and where there is truck farming. However this reuse for irrigation is done using waste water in its crude state or mixed with water from the oueds into which it has been flushed. So, for instance, the areas irrigated by this water cover 1,400 hectares in Meknes, 3,000 hectares in Marrakech, and 800 hectares in Fes (see table). A major part of the water from the Fes oued and its tributaries, into which this city's waste water is flushed, helps irrigate orchards and truck farming crops before rejoining the Sebou oued. For its part, the city of Meknes reuses a volume of 20 million m³ per year for irrigation. This type of irrigation is also increasingly used on the outskirts of medium-sized cities; for example, this second-hand water is used to irrigate 150 hectares in Beni Mellal, 55 hectares in Fquih Ben Salah, and 300 hectares in Taroudant.

Cities	Number of inhabitants, in thousands	Volume of waste water, in millions of m ³	Irrigated areas, in hectares
Marrakech	473	15	3,000
Meknes	352	14	1,500
Fes	530	21	800
Fquih Ben Salah	110	3	300
Beni Mellal	110	3	300
Khouribga	145	4	360
Totals	1,665	58	6,060

Source: Report of the May 1988 meeting of the Higher Water Council.

Estimate of volumes of waste water reused for irrigation.

This waste water, which, as a general rule, is not given any treatment prior to its reuse for irrigation or its disposal into the recipient environment, can result in some risks the seriousness of which follows the progress

of urbanization and industrialization. So the preservation of natural resources and quality of life carries with it the obligation to carry out a quantitative and qualitative check of thrown out pollution so the recipient environment's self-cleaning power will not be saturated. Similarly, reusing these effluents which are considered to have major potential as irrigation water makes their prior treatment necessary so that their quality will be in accordance with health and chemical standards as they relate to irrigation water.

Future Prospects

Experimental Projects in the Areas of Waste Water Treatment and Reuse

These experimental projects have been going on for several years in the cities of Rabat, Ouarzazate, Agadir, and Marrakech. Their goals are to test several purification techniques (pooling, filtration, percolation into the sand, a high-yield algal channel, etc.). They are being conducted by multidisciplinary teams made up of teachers, researchers from higher educational institutions (schools of science and medicine, the Hassan II Agronomy and Veterinary Institute, etc.), and by officials of the relevant ministerial departments (agriculture, public works, and public health).

Integrated Better Sanitation and Treatment and Reuse of Waste Water Projects

At the same time as the experiments, integrated projects pertaining to better city sanitation and the treatment and reuse of waste water are currently being studied in the major cities such as Casablanca, Rabat, Agadir, and Marrakech as well as in medium-sized cities such as Ouarzazate, Ettachidia, Khenifra, etc. So these projects are about studying existing sanitation networks and extending them as part of towns' urban planning, the most appropriate treatment systems, and the potential to reuse waste water either in agriculture or for other purposes. These three items are being studied in an integrated way so as to find the most sensible solutions with regard to the three components.

In order to continue these studies, a national commission has been set up; it is made up of the relevant ministries (Interior, Agriculture, Public Works, and Public Health). At the regional level, similar commissions have been set up.

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Economic Impact of Mjara Dam Project

93AF0279A Rabat ALMAGHRIB in French 3 Nov 92
pp 6-7

[Unattributed article reprinted from EAU ET DEVELOPPEMENT, date and page numbers not given: "The National Dimension of the Mjara Dam"; first nine paragraphs are ALMAGHRIB introduction]

[Text] *To cope with its ever growing water needs, the Kingdom of Morocco has begun implementing a bold policy to develop its hydraulic potential.*

As part of this, the use of Mjara was identified by the "Sebou" study project carried out in the 1960s, which was to be the capstone in hydraulic planning for the Sebou basin, whose Ouergha branch alone produces more than half the flow.

Studies done in the 1980s of the integrated management plan for the three basins, Sebou, Bou-Regreg, and Oum Er Rbia, confirmed the interest in managing the Ouergha branch to develop its hydraulic resources in favor of both the Sebou basin and the more arid neighboring basins of Bou Regreg and Oum Er Rbia, towards which a transfer of close to 700 cubic meters/year is at present being extensively studied after its usefulness was recognized by the Higher Water Council at its November 1989 meeting.

The national dimension of the Mjara project is demonstrated by both the size of the geographic area covered by the project and its contribution to the objectives of a national policy regarding the mobilization and development of water resources for the country's general development needs.

The integrated Mjara management project consists of the construction of the Mjara dam, the plant to be established at its downstream side, the Machra El Hajar intake dam together with channel G, and providing facilities to the agricultural area of [both] the third irrigation plot in the Gharb plain and the lower Ouergha.

Because of its scale, carrying out the Mjara project will have a certain impact on the environment, so protective measures must be seen to.

Given the Mjara project's conditions, the most important negative effects on the environment have been identified as being the flooding of fields by the dam's waters, the silting of the dam, and the eutrophication of the lake.

As far as the above-mentioned negative impacts are concerned, for which cost assessment could be made directly or indirectly, as with the rest of the environmental considerations, studies for the project attempted to draw up an exhaustive inventory and evaluate it both quantitatively and qualitatively. These aspects of the study were dealt with in a special file entitled "Environmental impact study."

The [following] text represents a synthesis of the results of this file with regard to environmental impact.

Project Overview

Geographic Location

The site of the Mjara dam is located on the Ouergha oued, the main tributary of the Sebou, and located 54 km from Ouezzane, the nearest urban center, 90 km from the city of Fes, and 200 km from Rabat.

Project Goal

The Mjara dam will make it possible to harness the waters of the Ouergha oued, which account for 13 percent of Morocco's total surface water resources and

thus to be able to achieve the goal of irrigating 1 million hectares [ha] by the year 2000.

The Mjara dam, with a 3.8 km³ reservoir, will regulate 1.7 km³ annually that will be used to:

- irrigate 100,000 has on the Gharb plain and the lower Ouergha;
- protect this plain from flooding with a more than 90 percent hydraulic efficiency;
- develop a 205-megawatt [MW] state-of-the-art power [supply] when the installation begins operation and 130 MW when it is up and running and produce 390 million kilowatts [kW] thanks to a plant at the foot of the dam with 240 MW of installed power;
- move water to the Rabat/Casablanca region where it is needed.

Project Stability

The dam is an earthen construction with a concentric shape. It has a core of fine silt and clay alluvial deposits pointing upstream, a downstream recycler of fine silt and clay alluvial deposits pointing upstream and, aiming downstream, one of berms made up of clay- and silt-like materials of colluvial origin. The dam is built on the oued's alluvial deposits at the end of the valley; but the core and its downstream drain continue up to the clay and marl bed to ensure tightness and control over percolation.

Closure of the dam on the right bank is ensured by a collar dike of a concentric shape resting on an alluvial terrace, the tightness of these alluvial deposits being ensured by the extension of the dike's core up to the foundation's clay and marl bed.

a) Associated facilities

- Spillway gate

The channel-type spillway gate is located on the right bank, running obliquely to the axis of the valley.

- Bottom drainage

Two bottom drainage [systems] are planned: the main bottom drainage system, to be built on the bank of intermediate sandstone on the right bank, and an auxiliary bottom drainage system to be built on the bank of lower sandstone and set up in a trench excavated into the side of the hillside.

- Factory surge tank

The factory surge tank is located on the bank of intermediate sandstone on the right bank. The tank's structure is similar to a tower, with four sluices (4 [6x16]m²) protected by screens.

The delivery pipe course, made of prestressed concrete and built along the bank of intermediate sandstone, is set up in a trench dug into the hillside. It ends in a distributor which feeds three forced conduits.

- b) Facilities for the temporary diversion of the oued during construction

During the first phase, the first two winters' flooding will be diverted by a channel (located in the oued's natural bed) bound on the right bank by the lower sandstone bank and on the left bank by a ring that makes it possible to dry out the second phase's diversion channel and the embankments of the dam on the left bank. The channel is designed for a flow of 8,000 m³/second (30-year flow).

The dimensions of the channel for the second phase are such as to accommodate a flow of 10,000 m³/second (100-year flow), since it will operate for two winters with potential damage greater than those of the first phase. The channel is designed to be as narrow as possible at a right angle to the dam and at this point it is completely protected by stone bedding.

During the third phase of the temporary diversion, flooding from the final winter will be diverted by the spillway gate (temporarily wedged into hill 145 NGM [expansion not given]) and by bottom drainage.

The Hydroelectric Plant

The Mjara plant's facilities include, from upstream to downstream: the factory's surge tank, supply facilities, [and] the plant with its control building plus outbuilding and 225 kV [kilovolt] station.

The plant is located on the right bank. It is of an exterior type. Its foundation is marked by the presence of three sandstone bars, which were used for the facilities' foundations.

This plant is made up of:

- one machine room;
- one valve room;
- one assembling room; and
- one control building and outbuilding.

The Irrigated Area

The Mjara dam will make possible the irrigation of 100,000 ha in the area of the lower Ouergha (15,000 ha) and in the Gharb plain (85,000 ha), a region that has been called the "Third Irrigation Trench" (TTI). The second irrigation trench is still in the process of being fitted out. This TTI area will be irrigated as follows:

- 30,000 ha by spraying and eventually by a main pivot; and
- 70,000 ha by gravity, using raised culverts.

Also planned is setting up 9,000 irrigated ha for rice growing, which would double the current area. Pumping stations that would bring the water up to the level of the fields to be irrigated [as published].

Flood Protection

Flooding on the Gharb plain is due mainly to the Sebou oued and its main tributary, the Ouergha. Although the Sebou, which is upstream from its junction with the Ouergha, drains a basin whose size is twice as large as the Ouergha's, in flood season what is brought by the latter is three times greater than what is brought by the Sebou.

It is not the peak flooding rate that determines the extent of the flooding and the damage it causes but rather their volume.

The biggest flooding recorded since 1933 occurred from 22 December 1969 to 22 January 1970, when the peak rate was 6,820 m³/second and, the volume of water that flowed through the Mjara valley of 4,039 km³ [as published].

With regard to flood protection planning, while guaranteeing a regular supply of water, the large scale of the Mjara dam will set aside a volume of greater than 1 billion m³ to control flooding. So by cutting down flooding by significantly reducing the volume [of water] released, the hydraulic efficiency of the protection exceeds 90 percent.

The Mechra El Hajar Dam and Channel G

The location of the Mechra El Hajar dam, on the Sebou oued, is approximately 20 km to the northeast of Sidi Kacem, approximately 18 km as the crow flies, upstream from the junction with the Ouergha oued.

The Mechra El Hajar intake dam will help irrigate the area that has to be set up on the left bank of the Sebou using channel G.

The engineering [for this] will include:

- The dam itself, which will create a 33 km³ reservoir;
- a surge tank which on an annual basis is expected to divert at a maximum rate of 68.7 m³/second into channel G;
- a link-up between the dam and the start of channel G; and
- eventually a hydroelectric plant.

Project Impact

a) The project's economic profitability

The economic assessment of the Mjara project was carried out with the help of two overall indicators (the internal profitability rate and a current net value of 12 percent) calculated in economic prices.

The benefits to be derived from this project result from:

- Agricultural development of the area to be irrigated as well as an improvement of cattle stock. The agricultural benefits which have been pinpointed account for 34 percent of the benefit created by all the project's component parts and have been defined as the difference between the net values added to agricultural production before and after the project.
- Developing hydroelectricity. Energy benefits are 17.2 percent of the project's benefits. Receipts from electricity are estimated by the economic costs of a thermal replacement solution.
- Protecting the Gharb plain from flooding, and thus flood damage to be avoided on the perimeter and infrastructure facilities. The corresponding benefits account for 12.4 percent of project benefits.

- Expanding the chemical industry, mechanical traction, and the food processing sectors. The benefits produced by the project as represented by upstream and downstream effects in these sectors account for 36.4 percent of project benefits. Benefits yielded by shipments from farm to factory have not been taken into consideration.
- Eventually moving regulated excess water towards the Casablanca region. The costs and benefits of this component have not been taken into consideration.

The internal profitability rate has been assessed at 15 percent and translates into an agricultural equipping rate of 10,000 ha/year if this work is begun three years after work on the dam. The highest profitability level has been sought by carrying out different sensitivity tests by varying the equipping rates and also the starting dates for the work. The following schedule has been set up:

- Work on the Mjara dam to be spread out over a period from 1991 to 1996, with water starting to flow one year before the completion of construction.
- Work on hydro-agricultural equipment will start three years after the start of work on the dam at a rate of 10,000 ha/year.
- Work on the hydroelectric plant will begin one year after work on the dam and be spread out over four years.

b) Social benefits of the project

With regard to employment, the project's first effect will be to alter the current trend towards a rural exodus and unemployment, both in order to keep the agricultural population in place, whose employment will increase, and by creating new activities that generate jobs.

So employment prospects in the area of agriculture should double. In the future the project will make possible the creation of 30,000 to 40,000 jobs tied directly to stepped up efforts to develop agriculture in the affected areas.

The project will also make possible the creation of close to 50,000 jobs in other sectors of the national economy, not to mention jobs created while the project is being worked on.

So when compared with the areas where there is already activity, especially the Beht area, the region's cities and villages will experience major expansion in the area of jobs created (business, services, etc.)

Negative Impact

Owing to the size of the dam's reservoir, the integrated Mjara project will result in major changes in social terms and on the environment.

According to the first estimate of a survey done in 1981, the dam's work area (1,200 ha) as well as the area that will be flooded by the reservoir (12,400 ha) will lead to the expropriation of the following:

- Dry farming lands, 10,000 ha;
- Irrigated farming land, including 1,000 ha of citrus fruits, [for a total of] 1,600 ha;

- Pasture land, 230 ha;
- Various orchards, 120 ha;
- Trees, including 2,000 olive trees, [for a total of] 3,000 units;
- Houses, 600 units;
- Roads, 46 km

It should be noted that the project's economic assessment took into consideration the project's main negative points, viz.:

- Project expenses included the cost of highway infrastructures linked to the Mjara dam.
- The annual costs of loss of agricultural production from the areas which will be flooded.

The population, which will be affected by the construction of the dam, will be moved and integrated into the regional context of the Ouergha Valley.

Environmental Impact; Effects of the Project on the Natural Environment

- The micro-climate

The climate in the project area is characterized by a relatively rainy season running from October to May and a dry, hot season for the rest of the year. Climate studies show that the presence of the reservoir will not have a noticeable influence on either cloud cover or rain pattern. The only anticipated effects relate to a reduction in the range of average daily air temperature variations, on the order of 1 to 2°C. for the area adjoining the reservoir and about a 5-percent increase in relative humidity.

So during the summer the major effect of the Mjara project will be:

—A change in evaporation in the area of the future reservoir; and

—Evaporation in the irrigated areas.

- Sedimentology

The production of sediments in the Ouergha basin flowing at the level of the dam site has been assessed at 11 hm³ [cubic hectometer]/year, meaning an average specific deterioration of 1,800 m³/km²/year and meaning that the unused trench of the reservoir, which corresponds to the lower intake limit will be filled within about 115 years.

The percentage of sediment trapped by the reservoir has been estimated to be 99.9 percent of what comes in. The result of this is that practically all the sediment coming into the reservoir will be deposited there, and from this will follow an increase in the transmission capability of the pounds downstream from the dam, general erosion over several km, and a reduction in the oued bed's slope and in the water line.

However the consequences for the stability of the littoral and the marine ecosystem near the mouth have been judged to be insignificant.

- Impact on flora and fauna

The dam's reservoir will flood an area 128 km³ made up essentially of farmlands. The flooded area is divided among:

- Forests: less than 50 ha;
- Shrubs: approximately 700 ha;
- Orchards: 1,000 ha;
- Farmlands: 11,000 ha.

The flooded species are of a seminatural variety and there is no interest in preserving them. New vegetation will grow on the shores of the future reservoir and might favor the development of a microfauna and the development of fish and birds.

With regard to fish, the dam poses the threat of extinction to the shad, a fish which climbs the river to spawn. Setting up ladders or fish escalators will maintain the development of this species if a study [yet] to be carried out were to demonstrate the importance of this species.

Besides, new species could be introduced into the dam: carp (*Cyprinus, carpio*), bass (*Micropterus salmoides*), and perch (*Eupomotis gibassus*). Developing them will help moderate the phenomenon of eutrophication thanks to the impact of their presence on the reservoir's ecological balance. However this would require that polluting waste in the dam and river be quite strictly monitored.

- Water quality and the eutrophication of the dam

Owing to the construction of the dam, the quality of the river water is changed in the reservoir and downstream. The first change is due to the phenomenon of eutrophication, whereas the second is the result of the combined effect of the lessening of the flow and the deterioration which occurs in the reservoir.

- Eutrophication

Despite the absence of direct dumpings of used water into the reservoir and detectable sources of major pollution in the basin, the Mjara reservoir is open to major eutrophication risks on account of certain climatic and hydrological conditions of the site: there is good sun, there are high winter and summer temperatures, and less water is brought in in the summer. As in other regions of Morocco, the soil is rich in nutritive elements (nitrogen and phosphates) which are necessary for the development of phytoplankton.

Simulation studies of the eutrophication process of the future Mjara reservoir have led to the following conclusions:

During the hot season, the upper layer of the reservoir, the epilimnion, will heat up more due to the action of the sun and warmer water coming in, up to approximately 28° C., than will the lower layer, the hypolimnion, which will remain at a temperature close to 15° C. The two regions, whose water will not mix during this season, will be separated by a layer with a major thermal gradient, the metalimnion.

Towards the end of the year, during the cold season, the cooling of the epilimnion and of incoming water, as well

as wind action, will cause the appearance of major circulation in the reservoir, the disappearance of the metalimnion, and a uniform temperature in the entire reservoir.

Simulations show temperature decreases down to 11 and 13° C.

This phenomenon is proven by observations made at other reservoirs in Morocco, which are of the monomictic type, characterized by a single season of total mixing of the water mass in the course of the year, and whose minimum temperatures do not drop below 13 to 14° C.

- El Makhazine and Al Massira: minimum temperature, 14° C.
- Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdellah: minimum temperature, 13° C.

During the thermal stratification period, the oxygen will gradually become exhausted in the lower layers until there is a shortage; it will in large part have been used up by the biodegradation of organic materials.

During the winter and spring, the reservoir's water will be well mixed and its oxygen content will increase up to values close to saturation.

- Water quality downstream from the dam

The quality of the water released by the dam into the river's downstream course will depend in large measure on the type of thermal stratification, which will prevail in the reservoir and on the rules for managing it. Simulation studies show that:

- The concentration of DBO₅ in the water released will be low, on the order of several mg/l.
- The concentration of oxygen in the water released will stay low in the first 50 km and be close to saturation at the junction with the lower Sebou.
- In dry years and especially in periods of least flow extending from June to November, which are very critical for the quality of the water in the lower Sebou, the flow rates of the latter will be increased thanks to releases from the Mjara dam. Since the water released will be almost completely saturated with oxygen, it follows that the quality of the water in the lower Sebou will improve.
- Impact on the pedology of irrigated land and drainage problems

The impact on soil pedology has been analyzed from the point of view of the risks of land salinization inherent in irrigation, and the study confirmed that the necessary steps have been taken with regard to setting up the agricultural project to suppress the salinization phenomenon, especially through the choice of appropriate crop rotation.

The water, which will be used for irrigation, has a salinity of approximately 1g/l and is classified in the category of "medium and high risk of salinity." The soil, which will

be irrigated, is heavy soil with a high risk of developing conditions of excessive saturation.

Setting up a draining system on more than half the irrigated area proves to be imperative. The study strongly recommends setting up a research program on existing drainage systems and new pilot plots [of land] whose purpose is to provide verification data for the performance of the existing system and a definition of the dimensional parameters for the future network.

Impact on social infrastructures and facilities

The road network: about 100 km of roads and tracks will be lost owing to the building of the dam, including flooded sections and sections, which will be rendered unuseable because they will be cut off from the network. The accessibility of the region's urban areas will be restored thanks to the development of a new network aimed at serving all of the region's [urban] centers and creating other necessary linkages for better regional integration.

Other infrastructures and social facilities: in addition to the road, the reservoir will flood a certain number of social facilities such as schools, [public] health centers, and telephone lines.

A full list of facilities which will be flooded has been drawn up and replacement solutions have been decided upon by common agreement among the parties concerned.

Impact on Public Health

The dam's water could become the source of water-borne diseases to the people living in the irrigated areas who get their crude water directly from the distribution canals. Schistosomiasis and malaria are the two water-borne diseases linked to the use of crude water and the development of irrigated areas. The area affected by the Mjara project already includes several irrigated areas and pockets of schistosomiasis and malaria already exist there. The study area exhibits many of the ecological conditions which help the spread of these two diseases: an abundance of water, significant natural precipitation, high average temperatures, irrigation by gravity, rice growing, etc.

But the potential risk of seeing these two diseases increase with the coming of the Mjara dam is a real one; on the other hand, it is not possible to predict the extent [of this increase], an extent conditioned, furthermore, by socioeconomic factors pertaining to the users of the water.

Measures to improve water management and to make the public more aware about sufficient contact with water and infection risks should help to sharply reduce the spread and the propagation of the two diseases.

Land flooding by the dam's reservoir and population displacement

The reservoir's compartmentalized state sets the area to be flooded by the water at 128 km². General census

documents show that there is a population of 15,000 people directly affected by the displacement, to which should be added the figure of 25,000, corresponding to the nonresident population, which works on the lands that will flooded.

For the hydraulic planning, which has been done to date, the state has resorted to expropriating the flooded land and providing monetary compensation to its owners. This solution has frequently been met with great disapproval by the people concerned and is the subject of a widely held unfavorable bias.

One of the main objectives assigned to the study of impacts of the Mjara dam was research into a proper solution to the problem of people who will be displaced.

Socioeconomic studies, which have been done as part of this study, have shown that the people affected by the flooding of the reservoir:

1. have a negative perception of the Mjara project as being aimed at other people;
2. live solely on agricultural products and are not inclined towards converting to other trades;
3. fervently want to be moved to neighboring lands to be able to continue being involved in agricultural activity.

Furthermore, these studies have shown that a solution of land indemnification, to compensate for the sacrifice to be made by the people affected for the benefit of the nation as a whole, is possible and can be implemented partially or totally.

The land to be redistributed could be either state-owned land or come from a partial expropriation of land benefiting from the added value brought by the dam.

Relocating [people] to land located downstream of the dam will make it possible to reduce the demographic pressure in the area upstream of the basin and in particular around the reservoir and to preserve the ecological balance in the reservoir area.

To mitigate the project's negative effects and ensure that their development is closely followed up on, the following measures should be taken:

- The project's influence on the microclimate could be studied with the help of two climatological stations, one of which is to be set up on the dam site and the other in the Gharb plain.
- To reduce silting and move silt downstream, study the possibility of releasing the first flood waters by the dam's draining system while at the same time paying attention to the risk of overflow downstream.
- To minimize the risks of eutrophication and a deterioration of the Ouergha's water quality, a certain number of measures should be taken soon. These are:

a) a reforestation of the reservoir's surroundings and the rivers upstream (design an anti-erosion campaign for the basin that flows into it), this to be done at the same time as hillside lakes and dams are built;

b) a systematic checking of water quality and for sources of pollution in the lake, and along the downstream course;

c) filling the reservoir with species of fish which feed on algae and zooplankton, of the silver carp type that were introduced into the Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdellah dam's reservoir;

d) controlling the demographic pressure on the upstream basin, in particular by not moving displaced people around the reservoir.

- In irrigated areas, take preventive measures to combat malaria and schistosomiasis by organizing hygiene and health education programs.
- Set up accelerographs along the reservoir to check how its sides are behaving before and after they have been filled with water.
- For flood protection, establish a floodable areas plan with different frequencies so as to better define soil occupation conditions.

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Details of al-Wahda Dam Construction

93AF0273A Rabat *L'OPINION* in French 25 Nov 92
pp 5-6

[Article: "Al- Wahda Dam: Russian Financing of \$128 Million To Be Repaid in Citrus Fruit]

[Text] The Russian Federation has decided to grant Morocco a loan of \$128 million (100 million ECU's [European currency units]) to finance the al-Wahda Dam.

The Ministry of Equipment and Professional and Cadre Training has confirmed that 70 million ECU's of the Russian financing will go for construction and equipment of the hydroelectric plant, with the remaining 30 million going for those sections of the dam that include flood spillway valves and structural protection of the plant.

Other sources report that the company responsible for completion of the work is TECHNOEXPORT.

The financing is part of a government-to-government loan backed by the Russian Government that will be repaid over a 12-year period with a five-year grace period and annual interest of 3 percent.

The Russian Federation is financing 70 million ECU's of the plant's cost, as stated previously, and the rest will come from the National Electricity Office (ONE) budget, the Equipment Ministry said.

The Russian loan will be paid back in goods, mainly citrus fruits.

Studies relating to work financed by the Russian loan are already under way. Work is scheduled to begin early in 1994 and the first electromechanical equipment will be delivered at that time (1994).

General on-site facilities have been completed, the temporary diversion is nearly finished, and 20 percent of the excavating for related structures (bottom drainage and spillway gate) on the right bank has been done. Work on the dam itself has also begun.

The overall cost of the plant plus lines connecting it to the system is an estimated 1.575 billion dirhams (143 million ECU's).

Located on the Ouergha Wadi 5 kms from the village of Mjara and 60 kms northwest of Fes as the bird flies, al-Wahda Dam will drain a basin measuring 6,190 km².

The hydrographic system of the Ouergha and its tributaries is highly developed.

The area has a mediterranean climate with precipitation varying within the basin itself from 500 mm on the pre-Rif hills to 1,770 mm at Jbel Outka and sometimes measuring 2,000 mm on Rif peaks.

The irregularity of precipitation and the absence of large permeable underground reservoirs create the extreme variability of the Ouergha Wadi hydrologic system from year to year and season to season.

The average annual contribution of the Ouergha Wadi to the dam site is 3 trillion m³.

Excluding any natural regulation of runoff, floods are the main factor in generating input from Ouergha.

Ouergha floods are characterized by their violence in terms of peak and volume. Their force stems from heavy rainfall in the upper Rif basins that can be of extreme intensity, the steep slope of waterways, and the impermeability of basins.

The waters of rivers in spate sometimes rise so high that the direct effect is flooding of the Gharb Plain, which occurred in 1962-63 and 1970. The floods are all the more serious because the Ouergha and Sebou rise at the same time and can exceed 1,800 m³/second, the figure for maximum flow of the Sebou Wadi riverbed after it converges with the Ouergha.

Features

The integrated project to develop water resources connected with al-Wahda Dam has the following features:

Al-Wahda Dam and its related structures will be 88 meters high and hold back 3.8 billion m³ of water, which will be used to regulate the flow of Ouergha Wadi. It will

also be used to control the rising waters of the Ouergha by means of an empty section reserved for that purpose.

The hydroelectric plant will have an installed power of 3 X 80 megawatts [MW], totaling 240 MW. It will be built on the right abutment of the dam and produce an average of 390 million kilowatt-hours.

The Mechraa El Hajar bypass dam and Canal G: Built on Sebou Wadi, this facility, along with its interconnected Canal G, will divert water to the left bank of Sebou Wadi for irrigation, including zones 5 and 6 of the third irrigated section of the Gharb.

The dam will be 22 meters high and hold back 33 million m³ of water. Canal G is 90 km long and has a carrying capacity at the outset of 70 m³/second. A hydroelectric plant will eventually be connected with this dam.

Lower Sebou dike: The dike on the lower Sebou will be 150-km long. Flow from the wadi will be 1,500-2,200 m³/second.

Development upstream: The project will also have 15 medium-size and 100 small dams.

These structures will make it possible to achieve optimum use of water from the Ouergha by improved control of rising waters and protection of water in the reservoir from silting. This fight against erosion will be backed by appropriate biological and mechanical techniques upstream.

Some 132 kms of new roads will be built and existing roads in the region will be improved.

North-south water transfers: al-Wahda Dam will make it possible to regulate 1.74 trillion m³ of water and reinforce national solidarity by reducing regional disparities in the water supply. It will actually be possible to transfer 680 billion m³/year of water from Sebou regulated by al-Wahda Dam to areas south of the basin. Such water will mainly be used to supply drinking water to Casablanca-Mohammedia (470 billion m³/year).

Anticipated Impact of Project

Damming 3.8 billion m³ of water, 1 billion m³ of which will come from flood waters, al-Wahda will regulate 1.74 trillion m³ a year, with an average annual input of 3 billion m³.

The regulated water will be used to irrigate 100,000 hectares [ha] in Gharb, supply drinking water to the Casablanca metropolitan area, and produce electric power.

The volume now regulated by the Idriss I, Ait Youb-Matmata, and De Garde dams is an estimated 1.6 trillion m³/year, almost 30 percent of Sebou's input. When construction of al-Wahda Dam has been completed, this volume will increase to 3.34 trillion m³, a rate of regulation of nearly 60 percent.

With the irrigation of an additional 100,000 ha, agriculture is headed for major changes in the future. Year-round irrigation will make it possible to develop industrial crops such as sugarcane, sugar beets, soybeans, peanuts, sunflowers, and rice, along with the more traditional grain and forage crops. Likewise, major development of milk, meat, and market garden production is anticipated.

The transition from extensive, low-yield crops to intensive agricultural development in the Gharb TTI and Lower Ouergha PMH will result in substantial profits of some 1.15 billion dirhams a year when cultivation is in full swing.

Production of Hydroelectric Power

The hydroelectric plant connected with the dam will have an installed power of 240 MW and produce nearly 390 in an average year.

Once in operation, the plant will generate some 230 MW at peak power. This power may be reduced from 130 [sic] to 209 megawatts depending on how much water is diverted to supply drinking water to Greater Casablanca (see table).

Project: Before and After

Crop	Area Cultivated (ha)	Production (tons)	Area Cultivated (ha)	Production (tons)
Grain	79,220	174,248	29,841	137,321
Legumes	13,100	18,340	675	1,688
Industrial crops	3,900	117,000	27,000	1,246,640
Produce	5,675	68,100	26,612	532,240
Oil-yielding	12,200	14,640	6,673	16,683
Forage crops	4,480		43,579	
Milk		10,689		183,780
Meat		3,266		11,040
Peanuts			8,200	14,760
Rice			7,683	34,574
Soybeans			10,213	30,639
Total	118,575		160,476	

Estimates of average annual savings resulting from flood protection are at least 200 million dirhams based on 1985 economic conditions.

Economic Impact

In addition to its direct impact on agricultural production, energy, and flood protection, the al-Wahda project will have other economic and social effects upstream and downstream.

Agricultural production resulting from the development of 100,000 ha of land will have to be processed and upgraded by agrofood industries.

Other branches of activity will benefit from the project during its construction and operation.

Mining Sector: Year-End Assessment

93AF0319B Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE
in French 18 Dec 92 p 8

[Article: "1991 Mineral Products Assessment"]

[Text] The Association of Moroccan Mining Industries (AIMM) says in its annual report for 1991 that the year was an unusually challenging one for mining concerns. The sluggish international market resulting from depressed demand forced mine operators to take steps to increase their capacity for "resistance and adaptability." So far in 1992 there has been only modest improvement in demand, but there is hope that total value-added for the sector will increase 4 to 5 percent this year.

Mr. Mourad Cherif, president of AIMM, minces no words in his efforts to focus attention on the deteriorating export environment for our mineral products.

He urged operators in the sector to "strengthen even further" their capacity to withstand the hardships of the downturn in ore markets and adapt themselves more effectively to the new realities of global competition. Thus, to take just the example of fluorospar, which is much in the news these days, not only was 1991 a weak year for Moroccan exports, but no immediate recovery is on the horizon.

China's big offensive and its dumping activities on major world markets, especially Europe, have not made things any easier for Moroccan minerals, which depend on the Community as a critical market outlet. Since nothing can be done to reduce production costs, the long-awaited 15 December decision by the European Commission to put a stop to the Chinese assault, because of its harmful effect on European industry, should also give a boost to Moroccan fluorine. After all, we annually export 80,000 to 100,000 tons of the substance. It is obvious, in short, that an organized market—and this goes as well for all other ores—provides the best environment for sales.

Critical Outlet

The recession, which has hit the Moroccan mining industry with such force, especially last year, is of course part and parcel of the global recession. Nevertheless, the roots of the crisis can be traced partly to lack of domestic incentives, according to industry professionals. The AIMM president contends, for example, that Morocco's mining legislation and tax structure create problems for the industry, impede its growth, and "seriously threaten its future."

Two years ago, the association of mining professionals entered into a dialogue with the government in hopes of achieving two objectives: redefining and reenergizing the national policy on exploration by appropriating sufficient funds to bodies created for that purpose, and amending the legislative, regulatory, and fiscal framework to meet the requirements of international competitiveness.

Optimist

To achieve the latter objective, the association hopes to see the entire industry benefit from a change in the status of mining companies, a less burdensome tax regime, and all the advantages of the Export Code.

While the AIMM is sounding the alarm, the Moroccan Economic Trends Center (CMC) is taking a more positive view of the outlook for 1992. Its optimism is tempered, however, by the fact that external demand is still picking up "only to a moderate extent," as the unofficial economic forecasting organization noted in its most recent bulletin. In fact, according to that publication, this slight improvement cannot induce more than a 4 to 5 percent increase in production and value-added for the current year.

In other words, Morocco's mining industry has not yet really seen the light at the end of the tunnel. It can only be hoped that the problems it experienced in 1991, especially the difficulties in marketing unprocessed ores and phosphate derivatives, do not linger on and blight post-1993 prospects.

Changes in Production¹
(in thousands of tons)

	1991	First Six Months		Percent Change
		1991	1992	
Phosphates ²	17,900	11,541	12,813	+11.0
Barytine	433.3	224.6	206.9	-7.9
Iron	96.7	50.2	33.9	-32.5
Lead	102.4	49.6	51.8	+4.4
Zinc	70.8	24.2	19.8	-18.2
Copper	38.9	21.4	18.2	-15

1. Source: Directorate of Statistics, cited by CMC (November bulletin).

2. The period covered for phosphates includes the first eight months of 1992 (January-August).

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